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Abstract
This thesis studies loss aversion and reference-dependent preferences. The second
chapter and the fourth chapter analyze the price strategy for the monopolist with a
loss-averse consumer following the reference-dependent model of K®szegi and Rabin
(2006). The second chapter takes into account the happiness of not paying at the
highest price and the disappointment of not paying at the lowest price and ﬁnds
that this happiness has a positive eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue and this dis-
appointment has a negative eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue. The fourth chapter
proposes a two-period pricing model and shows that the monopolist could make use
of two-price strategy to earn a revenue that is greater than the product value. The
revenue of the two-period model is higher than one-period model when the weight
of gain-loss utility is big enough. The third chapter studies the winner's regret
with bidders when they have reference-dependent preferences in the sealed-bid ﬁrst-
price auction, second-price auction and all-pay auction and shows that the optimal
bid is smaller with regret than without regret for loss-averse bidders, is greater for
gain-seeking bidders and is the same for risk-neutral bidders.
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The First Chapter
1 Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters that study loss aversion and reference-dependent
preferences in auction and how monopolist respond to loss-averse consumers.
The second chapter studies the behavior of the loss-averse consumer and the price
strategy of the proﬁt-maximizing monopolist in the market. This chapter builds
upon the reference-dependent model and takes into account the happiness of not
paying at the highest price and the disappointment of not paying at the lowest price.
Our results show that the happiness of not paying the highest price has a positive
eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue and a non-monotonic eﬀect on the consumer's
welfare while the disappointment of not paying the lowest price has a negative eﬀect
on the monopolist's proﬁt and a non-monotonic eﬀect on the consumer's welfare.
The third chapter models the winner's regret with bidders when they have reference-
dependent preferences in the sealed-bid ﬁrst-price, second-price and all-pay auction.
They have an endogenous expectation about the highest bid of other bidders and
have a sense of loss or gain when the actual highest bid of other bidders is diﬀerent
with their expectation. Considering these gains and losses as regret, we ﬁnd that
the optimal bid is smaller than without regret for loss-averse bidders, greater for
gain seeking bidders and the same for gain-loss neutral bidders.
The fourth chapter studies the price strategy for the monopolist with a loss-averse
consumer in a two-period model and ﬁnds that the monopolist could make use of
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two-price strategy to earn a revenue higher than the product value which hurts the
consumer making his utility negative. The revenue of two-period model is higher
than one-period model when the weight of gain-loss utility is big enough. And
the time factor has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue and the
consumer's welfare in the two-period model.
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The Second Chapter
2 Price Strategy with Loss-Averse Consumers
2.1 Introduction
Firms often oﬀer deals to attract consumers. This means that two diﬀerent con-
sumers can buy the same product at diﬀerent prices. Take for example, on a ﬂight,
a hypothetical passenger asks another passenger in the adjacent seat about his ticket
price and gets the answer of ¿150. The answer may aﬀect his utility. He will be very
happy if his own ticket was purchased at ¿100, however, he will be disappointed if
he bought it at ¿200. It's natural to ask about the eﬀect of such happiness and
disappointment. If we incorporate such utility and disutility into the consumer's
preference, what is the optimal price strategy for the monopolist?
There are several papers focusing on the optimal price strategy of monopolist facing
consumers with behavioral biases. Loss aversion is an important explanation of
sales and regular price strategy. The theory, ﬁrst introduced in 1979 by Kahneman
and Tversky, refers to the tendency for individuals to prefer avoiding to losses over
acquiring gains. K®szegi and Rabin (2006) develop a reference-dependent model in
which the loss-averse consumer use their rational expectations about the purchase
as the reference point. This chapter builds upon the expectation-based reference-
dependent preferences by adding the happiness of not paying the highest price and
the disappointment of not paying the lowest price to consumer's utility function.
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This chapter develops a model that takes into account the happiness when not paying
at the highest price and the disappointment when not paying at the lowest price and
tries to ﬁnd the optimal price strategy for the monopolist. Our results show that the
happiness of not paying the highest price has a positive eﬀect on the monopolist's
proﬁt and an uncertain eﬀect on the consumer's welfare while the disappointment
of not paying the lowest price has a negative eﬀect on the monopolist's proﬁt and
an uncertain eﬀect on the consumer's welfare.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 de-
scribes the timeline and the expectation-based reference-dependent model. Section
4 analyzes consumer's purchase plans and conditions for these plans to be the per-
sonal equilibrium. Section 5 presents the optimal price strategy and the eﬀect of
the happiness of not paying the highest price and the disappointment of not paying
the lowest price. Section 6 illustrates an example to show the optimal price strategy
and the eﬀect of the happiness and disappointment in detail. Finally, I conclude in
Section 7.
2.2 Literature review
In this section I review several studies about loss aversion and reference-dependent
preferences.
Bernoulli (1738) proposes the expected utility hypothesis on decision making under
risk which points out that people's choices are based on their expected utility, but
not on the expected value of outcomes. Based on this theory, von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) introduces the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in
their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior which is used as the basis of
rational decision making. Expected utility theory states that individual's preferences
are a function not only of the expected value of outcomes, but also of the attitude
to risk on the ﬁnal states of wealth. According to diminishing marginal utility, a
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ﬁrst ¿1000 is more worth to a person than the second ¿1000 when he is already
a millionaire. This theory can help to explain risk aversion, but still assumes that
gains and losses of the same size should have same utility for people.
Markowitz (1952) introduces a modiﬁed utility function to expected utility theory
which distinguish between gains and losses. Later, Kahaneman and Tversky (1979)
propose a full-ﬂedged theory, Prospect Theory, on individual's decision making un-
der risk. It is a powerful alternative theory to expected utility theory based on
theoretical and experimental evidence which points out that value function is gen-
erally steeper for a loss than a similar gain. The central idea in the theory are
reference-dependence preferences and loss aversion, that people are more sensitive
to losses than to the same magnitude gains. Over decades, loss aversion has played
an important role in a wide variety of economic domains. Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) use loss aversion to explain the return gap between stocks and bonds which
in known as equity premium puzzle. Camerer et al. (1997) presents the tendency of
New York taxi drivers to work longer hours on bad days to avoid the loss from their
daily income target. Hardie et al. (1993) use loss aversion to explain the asymme-
tries in consumer behavior to changes in prices and purchase of consumer goods.
Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) explain workers behavior of the insensitivity
of consumption to bad news about income by loss aversion and reference-dependent
utility.
One diﬃculty in applying prospect theory is how to deﬁne the reference point to
identify a gain or a loss which Kahneman and Tversky give less guidance. K®szegi
and Rabin (2006) develop a reference-dependent model which assumes people's ra-
tional expectations about recent outcomes as the reference point to identify gains
and losses. In this model, an individual derives gains and losses from diﬀerences
between consumptions and expected consumptions and also derives utility from
consumption levels. They apply the model to explain the consumer behavior and
cabdrivers behavior. Crawford and Meng (2011) follow K®szegi and Rabin's model
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to analyze the New York City cab drivers' working behavior with both time and
income target and yield a useful model on labor supply.
2.3 Model
This section introduces a pricing model with a loss-averse consumer. There is a
risk-neutral proﬁt-maximizing monopolist that supplies a product at zero cost to
a representative loss-averse consumer. The timeline of the model is as follows. In
time 0, the ﬁrm commits to choosing a price from a price cumulative distribution
Π for its good. The consumer learns the distribution and forms expectations about
his purchase decision: a purchase plan. In time 1, a price p is drawn from the price
distribution, the consumer observes it and decides whether or not to buy the item.
We assume that a consumer that is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying will
buy the product.
The consumer has expectation based reference-dependent preferences and his utility
consists three parts: (i) consumption utility, buying the product at price p gives
the consumer an intrinsic value v and a disutility for paying the price p. (ii) gain-
loss utility, as proposed in K®szegi and Rabin (2006), the consumer also derives
utility from the diﬀerence between his actual consumption and his purchase plan
(p˜, q˜), where q˜ is the quantity the consumer expected to consume (equivalent to the
probability of consuming) and p˜ is the average price he expected to pay when making
a purchase. For instance, if the consumer expected to buy the product at ¿9 with
one-third probability, buy at ¿6 with one-third probability, and not buy with one-
third probability, then paying ¿8 is a gain of ¿1 relative to the one-third probability
of paying ¿9, a loss of ¿2 relative to the one-third probability of paying ¿6 and
a loss of ¿8 relative to the one-third probability of paying ¿0 (not buy). In this
purchase plan p˜ equals 7.5 and q˜ equals two-thirds. (iii) the consumer experiences
a loss (denoted by γl) if paying a price that is not the lowest price in the price
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distribution when he expected to buy with positive probability (q˜ 6= 0) and a gain
(denoted by γh) if paying a price that is not the highest price when he is willing
to buy at the highest price (q˜ = 1). For the above consumption outcome with the
expectations, the consumer's utility can be expressed as:
u(v,Π, p, p˜, q, q˜) = (v − p)q + η · µ(q − q˜)v − η(pq − p˜q˜)
−γl · 1p>min{supp(Π)}, q=1 & q˜ 6=0
+γh · 1p<max{supp(Π)}, q=1 & q˜=1
,
where
µ(x) =

x if x ≥ 0
λx if x < 0
.
The quantity q ∈ {0, 1} is the amount that the consumer buys. The parameter η
measures the weight attached to gain-loss utility and λ > 1 is the coeﬃcient of loss
aversion. Note that we assume that loss aversion is only with goods. 1
In the expression, the consumer evaluates gains and losses over goods and money
separately. For instance, if the consumer expected to receive the product and pay
for it, then he treats not receiving the good and paying nothing as a loss in the
good dimension and a gain in the money dimension rather than a single gain or loss
depending on the total consumption outcome relative to the reference point. The
consumer evaluating these separately allows the monopolist to earn more than the
intrinsic value of the product by manipulating the consumer's reference points. This
is consistent with experimental results of loss aversion, such as Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler (1991).
To complete the reference-dependent preferences model, the consumer's purchase
plan should be time consistent, he makes the best plan based on the correct an-
ticipations in time 0 and knows that he will follow the plan in time 1. For time
1This is consistent with K®szegi and Rabin (2009) and Novemsky and Kaheman (2005) who
suggest that loss aversion is weaker in the money dimension than the good dimension.
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consistent expectations, if a consumer does not want to follow a plan in time 1, then
this plan cannot be formulated in time 0. Hence, a credible plan must be optimal
given the expectations it generates.
Theorem 1 Given the expectations (p˜, q˜), if it is optimal for the consumer to buy
at a price p′, then it is optimal for him to buy at price p < p′ for all p ∈ supp(Π).
Proof. When the consumer buys at price p′, the utility of buying is greater or equal
to the utility of not buying, u(v,Π, p′, p˜, 1, q˜) ≥ u(v,Π, p′, p˜, 0, q˜). The utility of buy-
ing at price p is higher than buying at price p′, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜) > u(v,Π, p′, p˜, 1, q˜).
Paying less increases the consumption utility and creates a gain in the money di-
mension while the reference points do not change. If p′ is the highest price, paying a
lower price p instead creates an additional happiness of γh and if p is the lowest price,
paying p avoids the disappointment of γl, otherwise, the third part of the utility func-
tion does not change. The utility of not buying at price p is equal to the utility of
not buying at price p′, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜) = u(v,Π, p′, p˜, 0, q˜): decreasing the realized
price does not aﬀect utility function when the consumer does not buy. Therefore,
the utility of buying is greater than not buying, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜) > u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜)
by transitivity, and the consumer will buy at price p. 
Theorem 2 Given the expectations (p˜, q˜), if it is optimal for the consumer not
to buy at price p′′, then it is optimal for him not to buy at price p > p′′ for all
p ∈ supp(Π).
Proof. If the consumer does not buy at price p′′, the utility of buying is smaller than
the utility of not buying u(v,Π, p′′, p˜, 1, q˜) < u(v,Π, p′′, p˜, 0, q˜). The utility of buying
at price p is lower than buying at price p′′, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜) < u(v,Π, p′′, p˜, 1, q˜).
Paying more decreases the consumption utility and creates a loss in the money di-
mension while the reference points do not change. If p′′ is the lowest price, paying a
higher price p instead creates an additional disappointment of γl and if p is the high-
est price, paying p loses the happiness of γh, otherwise, the third part of the utility
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function does not change. The utility of not buying at price p is equal to the utility of
not buying at price p′′, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜) = u(v,Π, p′′, p˜, 0, q˜): increasing the realized
price does not aﬀect utility function when the consumer does not buy. Therefore,
the utility of buying is smaller than not buying, u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜) < u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜)
by transitivity, and the consumer will not buy at price p. 
Hence, no matter what the consumer has expected in time 0, he will buy at prices
up to and including some cutoﬀ in time 1 (which could be 0). And any credible plan
should have this cutoﬀ structure. Suppose a credible plan up to buy at price p∗, then
this plan has an expectation of receiving the consumption value v and paying an
average price p˜ = [
´ p∗
0
pdΠ(p)]/Π(p∗) with probability q˜ = Π(p∗). Following K®szegi
and Rabin (2006), we call such a credible plan a personal equilibrium (PE).
Deﬁnition 2.1 The cutoﬀ price p∗ is a personal equilibrium (PE) for price distri-
bution Π if for the induced expectations (p˜, q˜) we have
u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜)≥u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜) for any p ≤ p∗ and p ∈ supp(Π)
u(v,Π, p, p˜, 1, q˜)<u(v,Π, p, p˜, 0, q˜) for any p > p∗ and p ∈ supp(Π)
In time 0, the consumer chooses the PE plan that maximizes his expected utility:
Deﬁnition 2.2 The cutoﬀ price p∗with induced expectations (p˜, q˜) is a preferred
personal equilibrium (PPE) for price distribution Π if it is a PE, and for any PE
cutoﬀ price p∗
′
and its induced expectations (p˜′, q˜′), we have
E[u(v,Π, p, p˜, q(p, p∗), q˜)|Π, p∗] ≥ E[u(v,Π, p, p˜′, q(p, p∗′), q˜′)|Π, p∗′ ].
15
2.4 Consumer's demand
Suppose the monopolist charges two prices, a low price p with probability q and a
high price p+ ∆ with probability 1− q. Then, a consumer has three possible plans:
plan N (never buy), p∗ < p; plan L (buy only at low price), p < p∗ < p + ∆; and
plan B (always buy: independent of the price being low or high), p + ∆ ≤ p∗. The
plan of only buying at a high price is ruled out by Theorems 1 & 2. In the following
analysis, I will determine the conditions for when plans N, L and B are PEs and the
expected utility for each plan.
Conditions for plan N to be a PE. Suppose the consumer expected never to
buy the product, in this case, the reference point is to consume nothing and pay
nothing. When the realized price is the low price p, if the consumer sticks to his
plan and does not buy the item, then his realized utility is
u(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
The consumption utility is zero and the gain-loss utility is also zero since he acts as
he expected. Instead, if the consumer deviates from his plan and buys the product,
his utility is
u(v,Π, p, 0, 1, 0) = v − p+ ηv − ηp,
where v−p is the intrinsic consumption utility from buying the product and paying
the price, ηv captures the gain he experiences from getting the product when he
was expected to consume nothing, and −ηp is the loss he experiences from paying
the price p when he was expected to pay nothing, and no additional happiness γh
and disappointment γl since he expected never to buy (q˜ = 0). If plan N is an
equilibrium, then
(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0) > u(v,Π, p, 0, 1, 0) =⇒ p > v.
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Similarly, when the realized price is the high price p + ∆, if the consumer follows
his plan and does not buy the item, his utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
Instead, if the consumer deviates from his plan and buys the product, his utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 1, 0) = v − (p+ ∆) + ηv − η(p+ ∆).
If plan N is an equilibrium, then
(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0) > u(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 1, 0) =⇒ p+ ∆ > v.
Hence, plan N (never buy) is a PE if and only if p > v, otherwise the consumer will
violate his plan and buy the product. Therefore, if the low price p ≤ v , plan N
cannot be a PE.
The expected utility of this plan is
q · u(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0) + (1− q) · u(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
Lemma 1 (i) Plan N is a PE if and only if the low price p is strictly bigger than
the product value. (ii) The expected utility of plan N is zero.
This lemma shows that even if the consumer expected not to buy the product, he
will buy at a low price equal to or smaller than v. In other words, setting a low price
equal to or smaller than v will make the consumer buy with positive probability.
Conditions for plan L to be a PE. Suppose the consumer only buy at the
low price, in the good dimension, the reference point is receiving the product with
probability q and receiving nothing with probability 1− q; in the money dimension,
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the reference point is paying price p with probability q and paying nothing with
probability 1 − q. When the realized price is p, following the plan, the consumer
buys the product and his realized utility is
u(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) = v − p+ η(1− q)v − η(p− pq).
The intrinsic consumption utility v− p derives from buying the product and paying
the price, η(1 − q)v is the gain he experiences from buying the product when he
expected to receiving nothing with probability 1− q, −η(p−pq) captures the utility
derives from paying the realized price p when he expected to pay price p with
probability q, and no additional happiness γh and disappointment γl since he only
expected to buy at low price (q˜ 6= 1).
Instead, if the consumer violates his exceptions and does not buy the product, the
overall utility is
u(v,Π, p, p, 0, q) = 0− ηλqv + ηpq,
where the consumption utility is zero, −ηλqv captures the loss he experiences when
he expected to get the product with probability q and ηqp is the gain he experiences
when he expected to pay the low price p with probability q.
If plan L is an equilibrium, then
u(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) ≥ u(v,Π, p, p, 0, q) =⇒ p ≤ v + ηq(λ− 1)v
1 + η
.
Similarly, when the realized price is p+∆, if the consumer follows his plan and does
not buy the item, his utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q) = 0− ηλqv + ηpq.
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Instead, if the consumer deviates from his plan and buys the product, his utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 1, q) = v − (p+ ∆) + η(1− q)v − η(p+ ∆− pq).
If plan L is an equilibrium, then
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q) > u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 1, q) =⇒ p+ ∆ > v + ηq(λ− 1)v
1 + η
.
Hence, plan L (buy only at low price) is a PE if and only if v −∆ + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
< p ≤
v+ ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
, otherwise the consumer will violate his plan. Therefore, if the low price
p > v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
or the high price p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
, plan L cannot be a PE.
The expected utility of this plan is
q · u(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) + (1− q) · u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q) = q(v − p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
Lemma 2 (i) Plan L is a PE if and only if the low price p is smaller or equal to
v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
and the high price p + ∆ is strictly bigger than v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
. (ii) The
expected utility of plan L is q(v − p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
This lemma shows that when the consumer expected to buy with positive probability,
he will be willing to accept a low price that is even strictly bigger than the product
value. And the higher the probability of purchase is, the higher the acceptable low
price is for the consumer. On the other hand, to make the consumer follow his
plan and not buy at the high price, the high price should be strictly bigger than an
amount. If not, the consumer will also buy at the high price and the probability of
purchase will equal to one.
Conditions for plan B to be a PE Suppose the consumer expected to buy the
item no matter the price is low or high, in this case, the reference point in the good
dimension is enjoying the product value v with probability one while in the money
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dimension, the reference point is paying low price p with probability q and paying
high price p+∆ with probability 1−q. When the realized price is p, if the consumer
sticks to the plan and buys the product, his overall utility is
u(v,Π, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 1) = v − p− η[p− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)] + γh.
The intrinsic consumption utility v− p derives from buying the product and paying
the price, −η[p− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)] captures the utility from paying the realized
price p when he expected to pay price p with probability q and price p + ∆ with
probability 1− q, and γh captures the happiness that he does not pay at high price.
Instead, if the consumer deviates from the plan and does not buy the product, his
realized utility is
u(v,Π, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1) = 0− ηλv − η[0− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)],
where zero is the consumption utility since he consumes nothing and pays nothing,
−ηλv is the loss he experiences from consuming nothing when he expected to con-
sume the product, −η[0−pq− (1−q)(p+∆)] is the gain he experiences from paying
nothing when he expected to pay price p with probability q and price p + ∆ with
probability 1− q.
If plan B is an equilibrium, then
u(v,Π, p, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1) ≥ u(v,Π, p, p+(1−q)∆, 0, 1) =⇒ p ≤ v+η(λ− 1)v
1 + η
+
γh
1 + η
.
Similarly, when price is p + ∆, if the consumer follows his plan and buys the item,
his utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 1) = v− (p+ ∆)− η[p+ ∆− pq− (1− q)(p+ ∆)]− γl.
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where −γl captures the disappointment that he does not pay at the low price
Instead, if the consumer deviates from his plan and does not buy the product, his
utility is
u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1) = 0− ηλv − η[0− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)].
If plan B is an equilibrium, then
u(v,Π, p+∆, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1) ≥ u(v,Π, p+∆, p+(1−q)∆, 0, 1) =⇒ p+∆ ≤ v+η(λ− 1)v
1 + η
− γl
1 + η
Hence, plan B (always buy) is a PE if and only if p+∆ ≤ v+ η(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
, otherwise
the consumer will violate his plan. The consumer prefers to plan B (always buy) as it
is essentially insuring the consumer against extreme ﬂuctuations in the consumption
outcome.
The expected utility of this plan is
q·u(v,Π, p, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1)+(1−q)·u(v,Π, p+∆, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1) = v−p−∆−(1−q)γl+qγh.
Lemma 3 (i) Plan B is a PE if and only if the high price is less or equal to
v + η(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
. (ii) The expected utility of Plan B is v− p−∆− (1− q)γl + qγh.
To avoid the disappointment of not getting the product, the consumer will accept
a high price under an amount strictly bigger than v. Here, the disappointment of
not paying the low price γl has a negative eﬀect on this amount as it appears when
the realized price is the high price. However, the happiness γh has no eﬀect on the
condition for plan B to be a PE since it is related to the low price. Both γl and γh
aﬀect the consumer's utility, hence have eﬀect on whether plan B could be the PPE.
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2.5 Optimal pricing
The monopolist is risk-neutral and tries to maximize it's expected proﬁt given the
consumer's behavior. The consumer has three purchase plans, hence the PPE could
be plan N, L or B.
2.5.1 Plan B is the PPE
If plan B is the PPE, the monopolist maximizes the revenue RB = p + (1 − q)∆.
To make plan B be a PPE, there are four cases as follow: Case 1, plan N, L are
not PEs, only plan B is a PE; Case 2, plan N is not a PE, plan L, B are PEs and
uL ≤ uB; Case 3, plan L is not a PE, plan N, B are PEs and uN ≤ uB; Case 4, plan
N, L and B are all PEs, and uN ≤ uB, uL ≤ uB.
Case 1 The monopolist maximizes the revenue subject to the constraints that plan
N and plan L are not PEs, only plan B is PE. Solving the maximization problem,
Max
p,q,∆
RB = p+ (1− q)∆
s.t. p ≤ v
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
or v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
< p
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
.
We have two regions of the solution.
When 0 ≤ γl ≤ η(λ−1)v2 ,
p = v
q = 1
2
∆ = η(λ−1)v
2(1+η)
R1 = v +
η(λ−1)v
4(1+η)
.
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And when η(λ−1)v
2
≤ γl < η(λ− 1)v,
p = v
q = 1− γl
η(λ−1)v
∆ = η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
R2 = v +
γl[η(λ−1)v−γl]
(1+η)η(λ−1)v
.
Case 2 The monopolist maximizes the revenue subject to the constraints that
plan N is not a PE, plan L, B are PEs and uL ≤ uB. Solving the maximization
problem,
Max
p,q,∆
RB = p+ (1− q)∆
s.t. p ≤ v
v −∆ + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
< p ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ− 1)v + q
1−qγh − γl
.
We have two regions of the solution.
Under the conditions (1−η)[η(λ−1)v−γl]
2(1+η)
+γh
2
−η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh > 0 and
η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh−
η[η(λ−1)v
2(1+η)
+ γh+γl
2(1+η)
]− γl > 0,
p = v
q = 1
2
+ γh+γl
2η(λ−1)v
∆ = 1
2
η(λ− 1)v + γh−γl
2
+ η(λ−1)v+γh+γl
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh
R3 = v + [
1
2
− γh+γl
2η(λ−1)v ][
1
2
η(λ− 1)v + γh−γl
2
+ η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh]
.
And under condition γl <
η2(λ−1)v−[ηγl+(1+η)γh]+
√
D
2(1+η)
, where D = [η2(λ− 1)v]2 + 2(2 +
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η)η(λ− 1)v(1 + η)γh − 2η3(λ− 1)vγl + [ηγl + (1 + η)γh]2,
p = v
q = [(2+η)η(λ−1)v+ηγl+(1+η)γh]−
√
D
2(1+η)η(λ−1)v
∆ = η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
R4 = v +
η2(λ−1)v−[ηγl+(1+η)γh]+
√
D
2(1+η)η(λ−1)v · η(λ−1)v−γl1+η
.
Case 3 The monopolist maximizes the revenue subject to the constraints that
plan L is not a PE, plan N, B are PEs and uN ≤ uB. Solving the maximization
problem,
Max
p,q,∆
RB = p+ (1− q)∆
s.t. v < p
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
or v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
< p
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
p ≤ v − (1− q)∆ + qγh − (1− q)γl
.
In this case, the optimal strategy does not exist. When q equals to 1 and ∆ equals to
0, we have the biggest revenue equals to min(γh,
10−2γl
3
). However, the monopolist
using a two-price strategy, q and ∆ cannot be zero. Here, I justify it with epsilon
equilibrium2 which one does not want to change a price that would increase the
revenue by epsilon or less.
We have two regions of the solution.
When γl ≤ η(λ− 1)v − (1 + η)γh,
p = v + γh
q = 1
∆ = 0
R5 = v + γh
.
2See Baye and Morgan (2004)
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And when γl ≥ η(λ− 1)v − (1 + η)γh,
p = v + η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
q = 1
∆ = 0
R6 = v +
η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
.
Case 4 The monopolist maximizes the revenue subject to the constraints that
plan N, L and B are all PEs, and uN ≤ uB, uL ≤ uB. The maximization problem is
Max
p,q,∆
RB = p+ (1− q)∆
s.t. v < p (N is a PE)
v −∆ + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
< p ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
(L is a PE)
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
− γl
1+η
(B is a PE)
p ≤ v − (1− q)∆ + qγh − (1− q)γl (uN ≤ uB)
p+ ∆ ≤ v + ηq(λ− 1)v + q
1−qγh − γl (uL ≤ uB)
.
We ﬁnd that the revenue of case 4 is always smaller than case 3 from the following
analysis. Since uN = 0 and uL = q(v − p) − ηq(1 − q)(λ − 1)v which is always
negative when v < p, we have uL < uN . Then we can eliminate the constraint
uL ≤ uB and then case 4 only has four constraints, N is a PE, L is a PE, B is a
PE, and uN ≤ uB, since if the price strategy satisﬁes the constraint uN ≤ uB, it will
also satisﬁes uL ≤ uB. In case 3, there are also four constraints, N is a PE, L is not
PE, B is a PE, and uN ≤ uB, three of them are the same as constraints in case 4
and only the constraint about plan L is diﬀerent. Under the three same constraints,
the revenue achieves the highest value when q goes to 1. However, q approaching 1,
satisﬁes the constraint L is not PE (in case 3) but not satisﬁes the constraint L is a
PE (in case 4). Therefore, the revenue of case 4 is always smaller than case 3 and
the ﬁrm will not set price strategies as case 4.
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Summary There are six possible price strategies when γl and γh have diﬀerent
values. The ﬁrst two strategies make only plan B a PE, the middle two make plan
L and B PEs, but uL ≤ uB and the last two make plan N and B PEs, but uN ≤ uB.
Plan B is PPE for all the six price strategies, and all of the six revenues are greater
than the product value v.
2.5.2 Plan L is the PPE
If plan L is the PPE, the monopolist maximizes the revenue RL = pq. To make plan
L be a PPE, there are four cases as follow: Case 1, plan N, B are not PEs, only
plan L is a PE; Case 2, plan N is not a PE, plan L, B are PEs and uB ≤ uL; Case
3, plan B is not a PE, plan N, L are PEs and uN ≤ uL; Case 4, plan N, L and B are
all PEs, and uN ≤ uL, uB ≤ uL.
Both case 1 and 2 have constraint N is not a PE (p ≤ v), then the revenue RL = pq
is smaller than the product value v since q is smaller than 1. Remember that when
plan B is a PPE, the monopolist can always earn a revenue bigger than v, the
ﬁrm will not use the price strategies in these two cases. Both case 3 and 4 have
constraints N is PE (v < p) and uN ≤ uL (p ≤ v − η(1 − q)(λ − 1)v) which are
contradictory. Hence, case 3 and case 4 cannot hold. Therefore, the monopolist will
not choose a price strategy that make plan L a PPE.
2.5.3 Plan N is the PPE
If plan N is the PPE, the revenue is zero, remember that when plan B is PPE, the
monopolist can always earn a revenue bigger than v, the ﬁrm will not use the price
strategies to make plan N a PPE.
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2.5.4 Summary
From the above analysis, there are six strategies may be optimal for the monopolist.
Given the value of the parameters η and λ, we could work out which is the optimal
one (see 2.6 Example).
With diﬀerent conditions about γl and γh, the six expressions of the price strategies
are as follows,
Under condition 0 ≤ γl ≤ η(λ−1)v2 , Price strategy 1 is p = v, q = 12 ,∆ = η(λ−1)v2(1+η) , R1 =
v + η(λ−1)v
4(1+η)
, u1 = −η(λ−1)v4(1+η) + γh−γl2 .
Under condition η(λ−1)v
2
≤ γl < η(λ − 1)v, Price strategy 2 is p = v, q = 1 −
γl
η(λ−1)v ,∆ =
η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
, R2 = v +
γl[η(λ−1)v−γl]
(1+η)η(λ−1)v , u2 = − γlη(λ−1)v [η(λ−1)v+ηγl1+η + γh] + γh.
Under conditions (1−η)[η(λ−1)v−γl]
2(1+η)
+ γh
2
− η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh > 0 and
η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh−
η[η(λ−1)v
2(1+η)
+ γh+γl
2(1+η)
]−γl > 0, Price strategy 3 is p = v, q = 12 + γh+γl2η(λ−1)v ,∆ = 12η(λ−1)v+
γh−γl
2
+ η(λ−1)v+γh+γl
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh, R3 = v+[
1
2
− γh+γl
2η(λ−1)v ][
1
2
η(λ−1)v+ γh−γl
2
+ η(λ−1)v+(γh+γl)
η(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh],
u3 = −[12 − γh+γl2η(λ−1)v ][12η(λ− 1)v + 3γh+γl2 + η(λ−1)v+γh+γlη(λ−1)v−(γh+γl)γh] + γh.
Under condition γl <
η2(λ−1)v−[ηγl+(1+η)γh]+
√
D
2(1+η)
, Price strategy 4 is p = v, q =
[(2+η)η(λ−1)v+ηγl+(1+η)γh]−
√
D
2(1+η)η(λ−1)v , ∆ =
η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
, R4 = v +
η2(λ−1)v−[ηγl+(1+η)γh]+
√
D
2(1+η)η(λ−1)v ·
η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
, u4 = −η2(λ−1)v−[ηγl+(1+η)γh]+
√
D
2(1+η)η(λ−1)v · [η(λ−1)v+ηγl1+η +γh]+γh, where D = [η2(λ−
1)v]2 + 2(2 + η)η(λ− 1)v(1 + η)γh − 2η3(λ− 1)vγl + [ηγl + (1 + η)γh]2.
Under condition γl ≤ η(λ − 1)v − (1 + η)γh, Price strategy 5 is p = v + γh, q =
1,∆ = 0, R5 = v + γh, u

5 = 0.
Under condition γl ≥ η(λ−1)v−(1+η)γh, Price strategy 6 is p = v+ η(λ−1)v−γl1+η , q =
1,∆ = 0, R6 = v +
η(λ−1)v−γl
1+η
, u6 = −η(λ−1)v−γl1+η + γh.
Proposition 1 The monopolist's revenue is decreasing in γl, the disutility of not
paying the lowest price.
27
From the above expression, we have ∂R
∂γl
< 0, hence γl has a negative eﬀect on the
revenue. The consumer faces uncertain prices before arriving at the store and a
higher price associated as a loss which reduces the consumer's willingness to pay
and hence has a negative eﬀect on the ﬁrm's revenue.
Proposition 2 The monopolist's revenue is increasing in γh, the utility of not paying
the highest price.
From the above expression, we have ∂R
∂γh
> 0, hence γh has a positive eﬀect on the
revenue. The consumer faces uncertain prices before arriving at the store and a
lower price associated as a gain which increases the consumer's willingness to pay
and hence has a positive eﬀect on the ﬁrm's revenue.
Proposition 3 The consumer's utility is non-monotonic in the disutility of not
paying the lowest price γl (but is monotonic in several regions when a particular
price strategy is used).
From the above expression, we have ∂u1
∂γl
< 0, ∂u2
∂γl
< 0, ∂u5
∂γl
= 0 and ∂u6
∂γl
> 0. The
consumer's utility is decreasing in γl when price strategy 1 or 2 is used; is increasing
in γl when price strategy 6 is used, and is keeping the same when price strategy 5
is used. For price strategy 3 and 4, the eﬀect of γl various depending on the value
of γl and γh.
Proposition 4 The consumer's utility is non-monotonic in the utility of not paying
the highest price γh (but is monotonic in several regions when a particular price
strategy is used).
From the above expression, we have ∂u1
∂γh
> 0, ∂u2
∂γh
> 0, ∂u5
∂γh
= 0 and ∂u6
∂γh
> 0. The
consumer's utility is increasing in γh when price strategy 1, 2 or 6 is used and is
keeping the same when price strategy 5 is used. For price strategy 3 and 4, the eﬀect
of γh various depending on the value of γl and γh.
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2.6 Example
The following is an example to analyze the optimal price strategies and the eﬀect of
γl and γh in detail. Let v = 10, η = 1/2, λ = 2, then the monopolist sets the price
strategy as follows.
Figure 2.1. Domain of diﬀerent optimal price strategies (The region 1 and 2, plan B is the
only PE. The region 3 and 4, plan L and B are PEs. The region 5 and 6, plan N and B
are PEs.)
In region 1, the optimal price strategy is, p = 10, q = 1
2
, ∆ = 5
3
, R1 = 10 +
5
6
,
u1 = −56 + γh−γl2 .
In region 2, the optimal price strategy is, p = 10, q = 1 − γl
5
, ∆ = 10−2γl
3
, R2 =
10 + 2γl(5−γl)
15
, u2 =
−10γl−γ2l +15γh−3γlγh
15
.
In the above two regions, the happiness of not paying the high price γh is small
enough, the monopolist charges a low price equal to the product value and a suitable
high price to make plan B the only PE.
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In region 3, the optimal price strategy is, p = 10, q = 1
2
+ γl+γh
10
, ∆ = 5
2
+ γh−γl
2
+
5+(γl+γh)
5−(γl+γh)γh, R3 = 10 +
5
4
+ 10(γh−γl)+(γl+γh)
2
20
, u3 = −(12 − γl+γh10 ) · [52 + 3γh+γl2 +
5+(γl+γh)
5−(γl+γh)γh] + γh.
In region 4, the optimal price strategy is, p = 10, q = (25+4γl)
30
−
√
25+150γh−10γl+(3γh+γl)2
30
, ∆ = 10−2γl
3
, R4 = 10 +
(5−3γh−γl)+
√
25+150γh−10γl+(3γh+γl)2
30
· 10−2γl
3
, u4 = −(103 + γl3 +
γh) · (5−3γh−γl)+
√
25+150γh−10γl+(3γh+γl)2
30
+ γh.
In the above two regions, the happiness γh and the disappointment γl are both small
enough, the monopolist charges a low price equal to the product value and a suitable
high price to make plan L and B the only PEs.
In region 5, the optimal price strategy is, q = 1, ∆ = 0, p = 10+γh, R

5 = 10+γh,
u5 = 0.
In region 6, the optimal price strategy is,q = 1, ∆ = 0, p = 10 + 10−2γl
3
, R6 =
10 + 10−2γl
3
, u6 = −10−2γl3 + γh.
In the above two regions, the happiness of not paying the high price γh is big enough,
the monopolist charges a low price strictly greater than the product value with a
high probability approaching one to make plans N and B the only PEs.
2.6.1 The eﬀect of γl
The following ﬁgures show the eﬀect of γl, the disappointment of not paying the
lowest price on the monopolist's revenue and the consumer's welfare when γh keep
constant(γh = 0.4). We can see that the revenue is decreasing in γl for all six price
strategies.
However, it's eﬀect on the consumer's utility are diﬀerent when diﬀerent price strate-
gies are used. We can see that the consumer's utility is increasing when γl goes from
0 to 0.44 (price strategy 3 is used), from 0.44 to 1.59 (price strategy 4 is used) and
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from 4.4 to 5 (price strategy 6 is used); the utility is decreasing when γl goes from
1.59 to 2.5 (price strategy 1 is used) and from 2.5 to 4.3 (price strategy 2 is used);
and the utility does not change when γl goes from 4.3 to 4.4 (price strategy 5 is
used).
Figure 2.2. The eﬀect of γl on the monopolist's revenue and the consumer's utility when
γh = 0.4
2.6.2 The eﬀect of γh
The following ﬁgures show the eﬀect of γh, the happiness of not paying the highest
price on the monopolist's revenue and the consumer's utility when γl keep constant
(γl = 1.2 or γl = 3). We can see that the revenue is increasing in γh for all the six
price strategies.
However, it's eﬀect on consumer's utility are diﬀerent when diﬀerent price strategies
are used. When γl = 1.2, we can see that the consumer's utility is increasing when
γh goes from 0 to 0.18 (price strategy 1 is used) , from 0.18 to 0.27 (price strategy
3 is used), and from 2.53 to 5 (price strategy 6 is used); the utility is decreasing
when γh goes from 0.27 to 1.28 (price strategy 4 is used); and the utility does not
change when γh goes from 1.28 to 2.53 (price strategy 5 is used). When γl = 3, we
can see that the consumer's utility is increasing when γh goes from 0 to 0.8 (price
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strategy 2 is used) and from 1.33 to 5 (price strategy 6 is used); and the utility does
not change when γh goes from 0.8 to 1.33 (price strategy 5 is used).
Figure 2.3. The eﬀect of γh on the monopolist's revenue and the consumer's utility when
γl = 1.2
Figure 2.4. The eﬀect of γh on the monopolist's revenue and the consumer's utility when
γl = 3
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter models the optimal price strategy for loss-averse consumers which
takes into account the happiness, γh, not paying at the highest price and the disap-
pointment, γl, not paying at the lowest price. Our results show that with diﬀerent
conditions about γl and γh, there are six possible price strategies could be optimal
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and all of them make the revenue greater than the product value. The happiness
γh has a positive eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue but has a non-monotonic eﬀect
on the consumer's utility while the disappointment γl has a negative eﬀect on the
monopolist's revenue but has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the consumer's utility.
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The Third Chapter
3 Bid Strategy with Reference-Dependent Prefer-
ences
3.1 Introduction
Traditional models of auction assume that bidders' utility for an outcome only de-
pend on their own proﬁt, that is, the diﬀerence between their value and bid. Later,
Engeblrecht-Wiﬀans (1989) introduces regret into the bidder's utility function. Win-
ner regret exists if the winner will regret when he could bid lower and still win the
auction and the loser regret exists if the loser will regret when he could outbid the
winner at a bid below his reservation value.
This chapter tries to model the bidder's preferences including loss-averse and gain
seeking bidders. In a sealed-bid auction, not only the winner's own proﬁt aﬀects his
utility, but also the highest bid of other competitors will aﬀect the winner's utility.
He may have an endogenous expectation about the highest bid of other competitors,
and uses to decide his own bid.
For example, you arrive at a tube station and expect the tube to arrive in 5 minutes.
If the tube arrives in 1 minute, you will be happy while if the tube arrives in 9
minutes, you will be disappointed. The happiness and the disappointment will
aﬀect my utility and have diﬀerent eﬀects. Similarly, in auctions, the gains and
losses derive from the diﬀerence between the expectation of the highest bid of other
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competitors and the actual second highest bid will also aﬀect the winner's utility. In
the sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction, the winner will feel a sense of
loss if the second highest bid is lower than expected and feel lucky (a sense of gain)
if the second highest bid is higher than expected. For the sealed-bid second-price
auction, the winner will feel a sense of gain if the second highest bid is lower than
expected and feel a sense of loss if the second highest bid is higher than expected.
Therefore, we form the winner's utility by a linear combination of proﬁt and the
gain and loss.
Our results show that in the ﬁrst-price auction, second-price auction and all-pay
auction, for loss-averse bidders, the optimal bid for the winner is smaller with regret
than without regret, while for gain seeking bidders, the optimal bid for the winner
is greater with regret than without regret, and for gain-loss neutral bidders, the
optimal bid is the same with regret as without regret.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section
3 describes the bidding model, deﬁnes the regret and provides the results and il-
lustrative examples. There are three subsections that model the ﬁrst-price auction,
second-price auction and all-pay auction separately and ﬁnd that the optimal win-
ning bid is smaller with regret than without regret for loss-averse bidders, greater
for gain seeking bidders, and the same for gain-loss neutral bidders. Section 4 is the
comparison of revenues for the three types of auctions, and ﬁnds that the revenue
of ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction equal to each other, but the revenue of
second-price auction is not. Finally, I conclude in Section 5.
3.2 Literature review
In this section I review several studies about biding behavior of regret and loss
aversion.
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) studies the eﬀect of regret in bidding behavior. He
considers the winner's regret if he could bid lower and still win the bid and the
loser's regret if he could outbid the winner with a bid less than his own value. He
ﬁnds that for risk-neutral bidders the optimal bid is the same with and without
regret if they weigh two forms of regret equally. If the weight of winner's regret is
heavy, the equilibrium bid is lower than without regret and if the weight of loser's
regret is heavy, the optimal bid is greater than without regret. Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay (2007) run a ﬁrst-price auction experiment with three regret conditions, no
regret, only loser's regret and only winner's regret and ﬁnd that the optimal bid is
lower with only winner's regret and is higher with only loser's regret. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008) also test the two types of regret in the sealed-bid ﬁrst-
price auction and present the similar result that sensitive to winner's regret lower
the bid and sensitive to loser's regret yield to a higher bid.
Maskin and Riley (1984), Matthews (1987) and Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006)
study implications of ﬁrst-price auction, second-price auction and all-pay auction for
risk averse bidders. Lange and Ratan (2010) study the ﬁrst-price auction and the
second-price auction with loss-averse bidders and ﬁnd that the former has a higher
expected revenue. This chapter studies the eﬀect of regret for optimal bidding with
loss-averse consumers in the ﬁrst-price auction, second-price auction and all-pay
auction.
3.3 Model and results
This section models independent private auctions in the presence of bidders who
have reference-dependent preferences in the sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction, second-
price auction and all-pay auction separately and then establishes the main results
and shows with examples and ﬁgures.
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3.3.1 First-price auction
There are n bidders with independent private values that submit sealed bids for a
single object, the bidder with the highest bid wins the item and pays an amount
equal to his bid. The winner's utility consists three parts: (i) the expected proﬁt,
that is, the probability of winning times the diﬀerence between his private value
v and his bid b, (ii) the loss when the second highest bid is lower than what he
expected, (iii) the gain when the second highest bid is higher than his expectation.
Then, the winner's utility can be expressed as,
u(v, b) = G(b) · (v − b)− αL
ˆ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B) + αG
ˆ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B),
where B is the maximum bid of other bidders and b˜ is the expectation of the highest
bid of other bidders, deﬁne by b˜ =
´ b
0 BdG(B)
G(b)
, G(·) is the cumulative distribution
function of the second highest bid, αL is the parameter for unhappiness when the
actual bid is lower than the expectation and αG is the parameter for happiness when
the actual bid is higher than the expectation. Simplifying the above expression, we
have
G(b) · (v − b)− αL
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B) + αG
´ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B)
= G(b) · (v − b)− (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)− αG
´ b
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)
= G(b) · (v − b)− (αL − αG)[
´ b˜
0
b˜dG(B)−BG(B)|b˜0 +
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB]
= G(b)(v − b)− (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB
.
Suppose b(v) is a symmetric equilibrium in increasing diﬀerentiable strategies. Then
in the equilibrium, the winner's payoﬀ with value v is
pi(v) = max
b
u(v, b) = u(v, b(v)).
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Applying the Envelope Theorem, we have
dpi(v)
dv
= uv + ub|b=b(v)db(v)
dv
= G(b(v)) = F n−1(v),
where F is the cumulative function of private values and ub|b=b(v) is zero in the
equilibrium. Also, we have
pi(v) = pi(0) +
ˆ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜.
Assume that the bidder with value zero will never win the auction pi(0) = 0. Hence,
we can solve for the equilibrium bid
br(v) = v −
´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜ + (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB
F (v)n−1
.
Remember that without regret, the bidder's utility function is just u(v, b) = G(b) ·
(v−b), by the Envelope Theorem, we have dpi(v)
dv
= F n−1(v) and pi(v) =
´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜
which is the same as the case with regret. Therefore the equilibrium bid without
regret is b(v) = v −
´ v
0 F (v˜)
n−1dv˜
F (v)n−1 .
Proposition 1 The equilibrium bid is smaller with regret than without regret for
loss-averse bidders in a ﬁrst-price auction.
For loss-averse bidders, αL > αG, they are more sensitive to losses than to gains,
then br < b, the optimal bid is smaller than the bid without regret. For gain-loss
neural bidders, αL = αG, they treat gains and losses equally, then b
r = b, the optimal
bid equals to the bid without regret. And for gain seeking bidders, αL < αG, they
are more sensitive to gains than to losses, then br > b, the optimal bid is bigger than
without regret.
When the private values are uniformly distributed over [0,1], the optimal bid with
regret is n−1
n+(n−1
n
)n(αL−αG) · v while the optimal bid without regret is
n−1
n
· v, the
former is smaller than the latter with loss-averse bidders, greater with gain seeking
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bidders and the same with gain-loss neutral bidders. When n = 2, with regret
b = v
2+ 1
4
(αL−αG) and without regret b =
v
2
, the following ﬁgure shows the relation
between the optimal bid b and value v when αL − αG = −0.5, 0, 0.5.
Figure 3.1. The relation between optimal bid b and value v
We can see that the green line for gain-loss neutral bidders (αL − αG = 0) is higher
than the red line is for loss-averse bidders (αL − αG = 0.5), is lower than the blue
line for gain seeking bidders (αL − αG = −0.5).
3.3.2 Second-price auction
There are n bidders with independent private values that submit sealed bids for a
single object, the bidder with the highest bid wins the item and pays an amount
equal to the second highest bid. The winner's utility consists three parts: (i) the
expected proﬁt, that is, the probability of winning times the diﬀerence between
his private value v and the expectation of the second highest bid b˜, (ii) the gain
when the second highest bid is lower than what he expected, (iii) the loss when the
second highest bid is higher than his expectation. Then, the winner's utility can be
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expressed as,
u(v, b) = G(b)(v − b˜) + αG
ˆ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)− αL
ˆ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B),
where B is the maximum bid of other bidders and b˜ is the expectation of the highest
bid of other bidders, deﬁne by b˜ =
´ b
0 BdG(B)
G(b)
, G(·) is the cumulative distribution
function of the second highest bid, αG is the parameter for happiness when the
actual bid is lower than the expectation and αL is the parameter for unhappiness
when the actual bid is higher than the expectation. Simplifying the above expression,
we have
G(b)(v − b˜) + αG
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)− αL
´ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B)
= G(b) · (v − b˜) + (αG − αL)
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)− αL
´ b
0
(B − b˜)dG(B)
= G(b) · (v − b˜) + (αG − αL)[
´ b˜
0
b˜dG(B)−BG(B)|b˜0 +
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB]
= G(b)(v − b˜) + (αG − αL)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB
.
Suppose b(v) is a symmetric equilibrium in increasing diﬀerentiable strategies. Then
in the equilibrium, the winner's payoﬀ with value v is
pi(v) = max
b
u(v, b) = u(v, b(v)).
Applying the Envelope Theorem, we have
dpi(v)
dv
= uv + ub|b=b(v)db(v)
dv
= G(b(v)) = F n−1(v),
where F is the cumulative function of private values and ub|b=b(v) is zero in the
equilibrium. Also, we have
pi(v) = pi(0) +
ˆ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜.
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Assume that the bidder with value zero will never win the auction pi(0) = 0. Hence,
we can solve for the equilibrium bid
br(v) = v −
´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜ − (αG − αL)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB − ´ b
0
G(B)dB
F (v)n−1
.
Remember that without regret, the bidder's utility function is just u(v, b) = G(b) ·
(v−b˜), by the Envelope Theorem, we have dpi(v)
dv
= F n−1(v) and pi(v) =
´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜
which is the same as the case with regret. Therefore the equilibrium bid without
regret is b(v) = v −
´ v
0 F (v˜)
n−1dv˜−´ b0 G(B)dB
F (v)n−1 .
Proposition 2 The equilibrium bid is smaller with regret than without regret for
loss-averse bidders in a second-price auction.
For loss-averse bidders, αL > αG, they are more sensitive to losses than to gains,
then br < b, the optimal bid is smaller than the bid without regret. For gain-loss
neural bidders, αL = αG, they treat gains and losses equally, then b
r = b, the optimal
bid equals to the bid without regret. And for gain seeking bidders, αL < αG, they
are more sensitive to gains than to losses, then br > b, the optimal bid is bigger than
without regret.
When the private values are uniformly distributed over [0,1], the optimal bid with
regret is n−1
(n−1)+(n−1
n
)n(αL−αG) ·v while the optimal bid without regret is v, the former is
smaller than the latter with loss-averse bidders, greater with gain seeking bidders and
the same with gain-loss neutral bidders. When n = 2, with regret b = v
1+ 1
4
(αL−αG)
and without regret b = v, the following ﬁgure shows the relation between the optimal
bid b and value v when αL − αG = −0.5, 0, 0.5.
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Figure 3.2. The relation between optimal bid b and value v
We can see that the green line for gain-loss neutral bidders (αL − αG = 0) is higher
than the red line is for loss-averse bidders (αL − αG = 0.5), is lower than the blue
line for gain seeking bidders (αL − αG = −0.5).
3.3.3 All-pay auction
There are n bidders with independent private values that submit sealed bids for a
single object, all bidders forfeit their bids and the high bidder receives the item. The
winner's utility consists three parts: (i) the expected proﬁt, that is, the probability
of winning times his private value v minus his bid b, (ii) the loss when the second
highest bid is lower than what he expected, (iii) the gain when the second highest
bid is higher than his expectation. Then, the winner's utility can be expressed as,
u(v, b) = vG(b)− b− αL
ˆ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B) + αG
ˆ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B),
where B is the maximum bid of other bidders and b˜ is the expectation of the highest
bid of other bidders, deﬁne by b˜ =
´ b
0 BdG(B)
G(b)
, G(·) is the cumulative distribution
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function of the second highest bid, αL is the parameter for unhappiness when the
actual bid is lower than the expectation and αG is the parameter for happiness when
the actual bid is higher than the expectation. Simplifying the above expression, we
have
vG(b)− b− αL
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B) + αG
´ b
b˜
(B − b˜)dG(B)
= vG(b)− b− (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)− αG
´ b
0
(b˜−B)dG(B)
= vG(b)− b− (αL − αG)[
´ b˜
0
b˜dG(B)−BG(B)|b˜0 +
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB]
= vG(b)− b− (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB
.
Suppose b(v) is a symmetric equilibrium in increasing diﬀerentiable strategies. Then
in the equilibrium, the winner's payoﬀ with value v is
pi(v) = max
b
u(v, b) = u(v, b(v))
Applying the Envelope Theorem, we have
dpi(v)
dv
= uv + ub|b=b(v)db(v)
dv
= G(b(v)) = F n−1(v),
where F is the cumulative function of private values and ub|b=b(v) is zero in the
equilibrium. Also, we have
pi(v) = pi(0) +
ˆ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜.
Assume that the bidder with value zero will never win the auction pi(0) = 0. Hence,
we can solve for the equilibrium bid
br(v) = vF (v)n−1 −
ˆ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜ − (αL − αG)
ˆ b˜
0
G(B)dB.
Remember that without regret, the bidder's utility function is just u(v, b) = G(b) ·
(v−b), by the Envelope Theorem, we have dpi(v)
dv
= F n−1(v) and pi(v) =
´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜
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which is the same as the case with regret. Therefore the equilibrium bid without
regret is b(v) = vF (v)n−1 − ´ v
0
F (v˜)n−1dv˜.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium bid is smaller with regret than without regret for
loss-averse bidders in an all-pay auction.
For loss-averse bidders, αL > αG, they are more sensitive to losses than to gains,
then br < b, the optimal bid is smaller than the bid without regret. For gain-loss
neural bidders, αL = αG, they treat gains and losses equally, then b
r = b, the optimal
bid equals to the bid without regret. And for gain seeking bidders, αL < αG, they
are more sensitive to gains than to losses, then br > b, the optimal bid is bigger than
without regret.
The logic of all-pay auction is similar like ﬁrst-price auction, the winner will also
feel lucky if the actual second highest bid is higher than expected. Also he will
regret if the second highest bid is lower than expected such that he feels he may
have won with a lower bid. The diﬀerence between the actual second highest bid
and the expectation in both ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction does not directly
aﬀect bidder's utility through payment but indirectly though regret.
Both in ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction the regret is not about how much
one pays (either when one wins in ﬁrst-price auction or overall in all-pay auction),
since this known in advance. This is like the second-price auction where it is not
known in advance. It is about whether or not one could have saved money while
still winning.
The fact that equilibrium revenue are the same between both formats (ﬁrst-price and
all-pay) indicates to us using a consistent model (see 3.4 Revenue non equivalence).
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3.4 Revenue non equivalence
This section is the comparison of the seller's expected revenue from diﬀerent auc-
tion formats. Recall that we have the optimal bid strategies for ﬁrst-price auction,
second-price auction and all-pay are as follow,
bF (v) = v −
´ v
0 F
n−1(v˜)dv˜+(αL−αG)
´ b˜
0 G(B)dB
Fn−1(v)
bS(v) = v −
´ v
0 F
n−1(v˜)dv˜+(αL−αG)
´ b˜
0 G(B)dB−
´ b
0 G(B)dB
Fn−1(v)
bA(v) = vF
n−1(v)− ´ v
0
F n−1(v˜)dv˜ − (αL − αG)
´ b˜
0
G(B)dB
.
And we know the density function for ﬁrst-price auction, second-price auction and
all-pay auction are nf(v)F n−1(v), n(n − 1)f(v)(1 − F (v))F n−2(v) and nf(v) re-
spectively. Then the expected revenue of the three types of auctions will be the
integral,
RF =
´
bF (v) · nf(v)F n−1(v)dv
RS =
´
bS(v) · n(n− 1)f(v)(1− F (v))F n−2(v)dv
RA =
´
bA(v) · nf(v)dv
.
Note that bF (v) · F n−1(v) = bA(v), so RF =
´
bF (v) · nf(v)F n−1(v)dv =
´
bA(v) ·
nf(v) = RA. The revenue of ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction equal to each
other, but the revenue of second-price auction is not. Suppose that there are two
bidders, with private values uniformly distributed over [0,1], the revenue of ﬁrst-
price auction and all-pay auction are RF = RA =
8
24+3(αL−αG) while the revenue of
second-price auction is RS =
8
24+6(αL−αG) .
In the ﬁrst-price auction and all-pay auction, αG is associated with the gain when
the actual second highest bid is higher than expected. The winner is a relieved to
still win since his expectation was lower. He feels lucky to win the item in the same
sense as just catching a train. And αL is associated with the loss when the actual
second highest bid is lower than expected. The winner regrets since he may have
won the auction with a slightly lower bid. However, gains and losses are diﬀerent in
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the second-price auction. The weight αG calculates the gain when the actual second
highest bid is lower than expected since he pays less while αL calculates the loss
when the actual second highest bid is higher than expected since he needs to pay
more. These eﬀects are totally diﬀerent and hence the revenue equivalence does not
hold in general.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter models independent private auctions in the presence of bidders who
have reference-dependent preferences. They have an endogenous expectation about
the highest bid of other bidders and using to decide own bid. In the ﬁrst-price
auction and all-pay auction, the winner will have a sense of gain if the expectation
is lower the actual second highest bid and have a sense of loss if the expectation is
higher than the actual one while in the second-price auction, the winner will have
a seance of gain if the expectation is higher than the actual one and feel loss if
the expectation is lower than actual one. Consider these gains and losses as regret,
we ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst-price, second-price and all-pay auction, the optimal bid is
smaller than the bid without regret for loss-averse bidders, is greater than the bid
without regret for gain seeking bidders and the same for gain-loss neutral bidders.
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The Fourth Chapter
4 Price Strategy with Loss-Averse Consumers in the
Two-period Model
4.1 Introduction
The economics behind sales is an important area of research. One explanation for
sales is that they generate higher proﬁts from individual's loss aversion where they
care more about losses than the same size gains. Using loss aversion, K®szegi and
Rabin (2006) propose a reference-dependent model that deﬁnes the reference point
as consumer's rational expectations of purchase. In this chapter, I extend the model
of K®szegi and Rabin to a two-period model to see whether the optimal price strategy
of sales that is in one-period model also is optimal for a two-period model.
Our results show that in a two-period model, the monopolist could make use of
two-price strategy to earn a revenue that is higher than the product value. For
example, the price strategy could be a sale price equal to the product value and
a regular price slightly higher than the product value. This strategy would then
make the discounted revenue higher than the product value when the time factor
is large enough since consumers would wait to buy. Also, the price strategy could
be a sale price slightly lower than the product value to attract the consumer and a
regular price higher than the product value. This strategy could make the revenue
higher than the product value independent of the time factor, since consumers buy
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immediately. The monopolist's revenue of two-period model could be greater than
one-period model when the weight of gain-loss utility is big enough.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 de-
scribes the two-period pricing model with loss-averse consumers. Section 4 discusses
consumer's purchase plans and conditions for them to be equilibria. Section 5 estab-
lishes the main results and shows that in the two-period model the monopolist also
could use a two-price strategy to earn a revenue higher than the product value and
the revenue is greater than one-period model when the weight of gain-loss utility is
large enough. Finally, I conclude in Section 6.
4.2 Literature review
In this section I review several studies about how ﬁrms respond to the loss-averse
consumers.
K®szegi and Rabin (2006) propose a expectation-based reference-dependent model
to study consumer behavior and ﬁnd that the expected prices and the expected
probability of purchase have a positive eﬀect on consumer's willingness to pay for
the product. Follow the reference-dependent model, Heidhues and K®szegi (2014)
consider a monopolist selling a single product to a loss-averse consumer. The optimal
price strategy consists of the low sale price and the high regular price which will lead
to a revenue higher than the product value. The sale price is low enough to ensure
that the consumer will buy at this price and hence he will purchase with positive
probability. To avoid the disappointment of not getting the item, the consumer will
also choose to buy at a suitable regular high price. This price strategy helps the
monopolist to earn a higher revenue but hurts the consumer's welfare.
Zhou (2011) and Karle and Peitz (2014) analyze implications of consumer loss aver-
sion and reference dependence with diﬀerentiated products in monopolistic setting.
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Carbajal and Ely (2012) study the monopolist's optimal contract with consumer
loss aversion and reference dependence. Karle (2013) studies the ﬁrm's advertising
strategy when consumers are loss aversion. Hahn, Kim, Kim and Lee (2010) con-
sider the design of menus for monopolist when consumers have reference-dependent
preferences and are loss aversion. This chapter extends the the reference-dependent
model to two periods and studies implications of reference-dependent preferences
and loss aversion in monopolistic setting.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Simple example
This sub-section introduces a simple example to help explain the two-period pricing
model. Suppose that we have a cake with value v and we expect to eat today with
probability q. If we do not eat eat today, the probability of eating tomorrow is also
q. The parameter η measures the weight attached to gain-loss utility, λ > 1 is the
coeﬃcient of loss aversion and β is the time factor.
If we eat the cake today, the utility function is
v + η(−q + 1)v + βη[−(1− q)q + 0]λv
where v is the consumption utility of eating the cake, η(−q + 1)v is the gain we
experience from eating the cake when we expected to eat with probability 1 − q.
The expression βη[−(1 − q)q + 0]λv is the loss that we experience from not eating
tomorrow when we expected to eat tomorrow with probability (1− q)q.
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Instead, if we do not eat today, the utility function is
0 + η(−q + 0)λv + βη[−(1− q)q + q]v
+qβ[v + η(−q + 1)v]
+(1− q)β[0 + η(−q + 0)λv]
where zero is the consumption utility today, η(−q+0)v is the loss we experience from
not eating today when we expected to eat with probability q, and βη[−(1−q)q+q]v
is the gain-loss utility of eating tomorrow caused by its probability changing from
(1−q)q to q. The second line is the expected consumption utility and gain-loss utility
of tomorrow when we eat the cake tomorrow, while the third line is the expected
consumption utility and gain-loss utility of tomorrow when we do not eat tomorrow.
From the example, we can see that the consumer has the ability to eat tomorrow
which can oﬀset not eating today. However, there can be loss aversion incurred from
eating today since it lowers the chance of eating tomorrow. In this two-period model,
it's natural to ask what is the optimal strategy for two-period model and compare
this to one-period model and see if the monopolist earn more in the two-period
model.
4.3.2 Two-period pricing model
This section introduces a two-period pricing model with a risk-neutral monopolist
that supplies a nondurable good at zero cost to a representative loss-averse consumer.
The interaction between the monopolist and the consumer is as follows. Before the
two periods start, the ﬁrm commits to choosing a price from a price cumulative
distribution Π for both periods. The consumer learns the distribution and forms
expectations about his purchase decision for time 1 and 2. We call these expectations
as a purchase plan. In time 1, a price p1 is drawn from the price distribution. The
consumer observes it and decides whether or not to buy the product. If the consumer
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buy the item, the model ends. If not, in time 2, a price p2 drawn from the price
distribution Π, the consumer observes it and decides whether or not to buy. The
consumer only needs one product and does not buy at both time 1 and 2. We
assume that a consumer that is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying will buy
the product.
The consumer has expectation-based reference-dependent preferences and his utility
consists two parts. One is consumption utility, buying the product at price pi gives
the consumer an intrinsic value v and a disutility for paying the price pi, where
pi is the price in time i (i ∈ {1, 2}). The other is gain-loss utility, as proposed
in K®szegin and Rabin (2006), that is, the consumer also derives utility from the
diﬀerence between his actual consumption and his purchase plan (p˜i, q˜i), where q˜i
is the quantity the consumer expected to consume in time i (equivalent to the
probability of consuming) and p˜i is the average price in time i that he expected
to pay when making a purchase. Hence, the consumer's utility in time 2 can be
expressed as:
u2(v,Π, p2, p˜2, q2, q˜2) = q2(v − p2) + η · µ(−q˜2 + q2)v + η(−q˜2p˜2 + q2p2),
where
µ(x) =

x if x ≥ 0,
λx if x < 0.
The quantity qi ∈ {0, 1} is the amount that the consumer buys time i and βc is the
consumer's time factor. Note that we assume that loss aversion is only with goods.
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The consumer's utility in time 1 can be expressed as
u1(v,Π, p1, p˜1, p˜2, q1, q˜1, q˜2) = q1(v − p1)
+η · µ(−q˜1 + q1)v + η(−p˜1q˜1 + p1q1)
+βcη · µ[−(1− q˜1)q˜2 + (1− q1)q˜2]v − βcη[−(1− q˜1)q˜2p˜2 + (1− q1)q˜2p˜2]
+(1− q1)q˜2βc(v − p˜2)
+(1− q1)[q˜2βcη(−q˜2 + 1)(v − p˜2)− (1− q˜2)βcη(−q˜2 + 0)(λv − p˜2).
The ﬁrst line is the consumption utility in time 1, second line is the gain-loss utility
from the probability changing of purchase behavior in time 1, the third line is the
gain-loss utility from the probability changing of purchase behavior in time 2, the
forth line is the expected consumption utility in time 2, and the ﬁfth line is the
expected gain-loss utility from the probability changing of purchase behavior in
time 2.
To complete the reference-dependent preferences model, the consumer's purchase
plan should be time consistent, that is, he makes the best plan for time 1 and 2
based on correct anticipations before the two periods start and knows that he will
follow the plan in time 1 and 2. For time consistent expectations, if a consumer
does not want to follow a plan in time 1 and 2, then this plan cannot be formulated.
Hence, a credible plan must be optimal given the expectations it generates.
Hence, no matter what the consumer has expected before the two periods start, he
will buy at prices up to and including some cutoﬀ (which could be 0). Any credible
plan should have this cutoﬀ structure. Suppose a credible plan is to buy up to price
p∗i , then this plan has an expectation of receiving the consumption value v and paying
an average price p˜i = [
´ p∗i
0
pdΠ(p)]/Π(p∗i ) with probability q˜i = Π(p
∗
i ). Following
K®szegi and Rabin (2006), we call such a credible plan a personal equilibrium (PE).
Deﬁnition 4.1 The cutoﬀ price p∗i is a personal equilibrium (PE) for price distri-
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bution Π if for the induced expectations (p˜i, q˜i) we have
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p˜1, 1, q˜1)=u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p˜1, 0, q˜1) for any p
∗
i ∈ supp(Π),
u2(v,Π, p
∗
2, p˜2, 1, q˜2)=u2(v,Π, p
∗
2, p˜2, 0, q˜2) for any p
∗
i ∈ supp(Π).
Before the two periods start, the consumer chooses the PE plan that maximizes his
expected utility.
Deﬁnition 4.2 The cutoﬀ price p∗iwith induced expectations (p˜i, q˜i) is a preferred
personal equilibrium (PPE) for price distribution Π if it is a PE, and for any PE
cutoﬀ price p∗
′
i and its induced expectations (p˜i
′, q˜i′), we have
E[ui(v,Π, p
∗
i , p˜i, qi, q˜)] ≥ E[ui(v,Π, p∗
′
i , p˜i
′, qi, q˜′)].
4.4 Consumer's demand
Suppose the monopolist charges two prices, a low price p with probability q and a
high price p + ∆ with probability 1 − q in both time 1 and time 2. The consumer
has three possible plans in each period: N, never buy, p∗ < p; L, buy only at the
low price, p ≤ p∗ < p+ ∆; and B, always buy: independent of the price being low or
high, p + ∆ ≤ p∗. There are two periods, each period has three choices, therefore,
the consumer has nine plans in total. This section analyzes conditions to be a PE
and expected utilities for all the nine plans.
4.4.1 Time 2
We start the analysis with time 2's plans since they will help us to understand time
1's plans which is more complicated. If the consumer does not buy the product
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in time 1, the model goes in time 2. There are three diﬀerent expectations about
purchase behavior in time 2: N, never buy; L, buy only at the low price; and B,
always buy ( is the plan of time 1).
Plan N When the consumer expected never to buy in time 2, the reference point
is to consume nothing and pay nothing in time 2. Assume that the realized price is
p∗2, if the consumer sticks to his plan and does not buy the product, his utility is
u2(v,Π, p
∗
2, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
The consumption utility is zero and the gain-loss utility is also zero since he acts
according to his plan. Instead, if the consumer deviates from his plan and buys the
product, his utility is
u2(v,Π, p
∗
2, 0, 1, 0) = v − p∗2 + ηv − ηp∗2,
where v−p∗2 is the intrinsic consumption utility from buying the product and paying
the price, ηv captures the gain of the unexpected product value, and −ηp∗2 is the
loss of the unexpected payment p∗2.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗2 + ηv − ηp∗2 = 0. (1)
Equation (1) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗2 = v, together with the condition p
∗ < p,
we have the condition p > v. Thus, plan N is a PE if and only if p > v, otherwise
the consumer will violate his plan and buy the product as the left of equation (1) is
strictly decreasing in p∗2. Therefore, if the low price p ≤ v, plan N cannot be a PE.
The expected utility of this plan consists of two parts. When realized price is p, we
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have
u2(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0) = 0,
where both the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility is zero, and it is the
same when the realized price is p+ ∆,
u2(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
Therefore, the expected utility is
q · u2(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0) + (1− q) · u2(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
Plan L When the consumer expected to buy only at the low price in time 2, the
reference point in the good dimension is receiving the product with probability q
and receiving nothing with probability 1− q and in the money dimension is paying
price p with probability q and paying nothing with probability 1 − q in time 2. If
the consumer buys the product, his utility is
u(v,Π, p∗2, p, 1, q) = v − p∗2 + η(1− q)v − η(p∗2 − pq).
The consumption utility v − p∗2 derives from receiving the product and paying the
price, η(1 − q)v is the gain he experiences from receiving the product when he
expected to receiving nothing with probability 1− q, η(p∗2− pq) captures the utility
derives from paying the realized price p∗2 when he expected to pay price p with
probability q.
Instead, if the consumer does not buy the item, his utility is
u(v,Π, p∗2, p, 0, q) = 0− ηλqv + ηpq,
where zero is the consumption utility, −ηλqv captures the loss he experiences from
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receiving nothing when he expected to receive the product with probability q and
ηqp is the gain he experiences from paying nothing when he expected to pay the low
price p with probability q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗2 + η(1− q)v − η(p∗2 − pq) = 0− ηλqv + ηpq. (2)
Equation (2) implies the cutoﬀ price p∗2 = v +
ηq(λ−1)v
1+η
, together with the condition
p ≤ p∗ < p+∆, we have v+ η(λ−1)qv
1+η
−∆ < p ≤ v+ η(λ−1)qv
1+η
. Thus, plan L is a PE if
and only if v+ η(λ−1)qv
1+η
−∆ < p < v+ η(λ−1)qv
1+η
, if the high price p+ ∆ ≤ v+ η(λ−1)qv
1+η
,
the consumer will buy the item even if the realized price is high while if the low
price p > v + η(λ−1)qv
1+η
, the consumer will not buy even if the realized price is low.
Therefore, if the high price p + ∆ ≤ v + η(λ−1)qv
1+η
or the low price p > v + η(λ−1)qv
1+η
,
plan L cannot be a PE.
The expected utility of this plan consists of two parts. When realized price is p, we
have
u2(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) = v − p+ η(1− q)v − η(p− pq),
where v − p is the consumption utility, η(1− q)v is the gain in the good dimension
while −η(p − pq) is the loss in the money dimension. When the realized price is
p+ ∆, we have
u2(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q) = 0− ηλqv + ηpq,
where zero is the consumption utility, −ηλqv is the loss in the good dimension and
ηpq is the gain in the money dimension. Therefore, the expected utility is
q · u(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) + (1− q) · u(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q) = q(v − p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
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Plan B When the consumer expected always to buy the item in time 2 no matter
the price is low or high, the reference point in the good dimension is enjoying the
product value v with probability one while in the money dimension, the reference
point is paying the low price p with probability q and paying the high price p + ∆
with probability 1 − q in time 2. If the consumer sticks to the plan and buys the
product, his utility is
u(v,Π, p∗2, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 1) = v − p∗2 − η[p∗2 − pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)].
The intrinsic consumption utility is v−p∗2 and −η[p∗2−pq− (1− q)(p+ ∆)] captures
the utility from paying the realized price p∗2 when he expected to pay price p with
probability q and price p+ ∆ with probability 1− q.
Instead, if the consumer deviates from the plan and does not buy the product, his
utility is
u(v,Π, p∗2, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1) = 0− ηλv − η[0− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)],
where zero is the consumption utility, −ηv is the loss he experiences from consuming
nothing when he expected to consume the product and −η[0−pq− (1−q)(p+∆)] is
the gain he experiences from paying nothing when he expected to pay price p with
probability q and price p+ ∆ with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗2 − η[p∗2 − pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)] = 0− ηλv − η[0− pq − (1− q)(p+ ∆)]. (3)
Equation (3) implies the cutoﬀ price p∗2 =
1+ηλ
1+η
v, together with p+ ∆ ≤ p∗, we have
the condition p+ ∆ ≤ 1+ηλ
1+η
v. Hence, plan B is a PE if and only if p ≤ 1+ηλ
1+η
v −∆.
The expected utility of this plan consist of two parts. When realized price is p, we
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have
u2(v,Π, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 1) = v − p+ η(1− q)∆,
where v − p is the consumption utility and η(1 − q)∆ is the gain in the money
dimension. When the realized price is p+ ∆
u2(v,Π, p+ ∆, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 1) = v − p−∆− ηq∆,
where v − p − ∆ is the consumption utility and −ηq∆ is the loss in the money
dimension. Therefore, the expected utility is
q·u(v,Π, p, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1)+(1−q)·u(v,Π, p+∆, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1) = v−p−∆(1−q).
These conditions for plan -N, -L and -B to be the PE are the same as conditions
of plan N, L, B in one-period model, which state that if the low price equals to
or smaller than product value v, the consumer will buy with positive probability
(buy at this low price) with any plan. And with positive probability of buying, the
consumer is willing to accept a suitable high price which is strictly higher than v.
Under the two-price strategy, the consumer will buy with probability one and the
monopolist will earn a revenue higher than the product value.
4.4.2 Time 1
In time 0, the consumer learns the price distribution of the product, the low price p
with probability q and the high price p+∆ with probability 1−q and then he makes
his purchase plan for time 1 and time 2. There are nine possibilities: plan NN, NL,
NB, LN, LL, LB, BN, BL, BB. For example, plan LL means that the consumer
expected to buy at the low price in time 1, if there is a high price in time 1 then
buy only at the low price in time 2.
61
Plan NN The consumer expected never to buy the product both in time 1 and
2. In time 1, the realized price is p∗1, if the consumer sticks to his plan and does not
buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0,
where the consumption utility is zero and the gain-loss utility is zero since he acts as
his expectation. Instead, if he deviates from his plan and buys in time 1, his utility
is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) = v − p∗1 + ηv − ηp∗1,
where v − p∗1 is the consumption utility derives from receiving the product and pay
the realized price, ηv is the gain he experiences from reviving the product where
he expected to receive nothing and −ηp∗1 is the loss he experiences from paying the
realized price where he expected to pay nothing.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηv − ηp∗1 = 0. (4)
Equation (4) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 = v, together with the condition p
∗
1 < p,
we have v < p. Hence, plan NN is a PE if and only if v < p, otherwise plan NN
cannot be a PE.
This condition is the same as the condition of plan N in one-period model, which
states that the product value v is a price that the consumer cannot reject even when
the consumer expected not buy.
The expected utility of plan NN is
q · u1(v,Π, p, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
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where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of not buying when price is low with prob-
ability q which equals zero and the second expression is the utility of not buying
when the price is high with probability 1− q which equals zero, too. Therefore, the
total expected utility is zero.
Plan NL The consumer expected never to buy in time 1 and buy only at the low
price in time 2. If the consumer sticks to his plan and does not buy in time 1, his
utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, p, 0, 0, q) = 0
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)],
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility in time 1 which
is the same as plan NN. The second line is the expected utility of time 2, βcq[v −
p + η(1 − q)(v − p)] is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility of buying the
item in time 2 when the realized price is low and βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)] is the
utility of not buying the item when the realized price is high.
Instead, if the consumer violates his plan and buys the product in time 1, his utility
is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, p, 1, 0, q) = v − p∗1 + ηv − ηp∗1
+βcη(−q + 0)(λv − p),
where the ﬁrst line is consumption utility and gain-loss utility in time 1 which is
the same as plan NN. The second line is the expected utility of time 2, buying in
time 1 means lost the opportunity to buy in time 2, βcη(−q + 0)(λv − p) is the the
loss of the product and the gain of the money with probability q since originally he
expected to buy in time 2 with probability q and then the probability of buying in
time 2 goes to zero if he buys in time 1.
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When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + η(v − p∗1) + βcη(−q + 0)(λv − p)
= 0 + βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)].
(5)
Equation (5) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
(1+η)v−βc[1+η(1−q)+ηλq]qv+βc(1+η)qp
1+η
,
together with the condition p∗1 < p, we have v − η(λ−1)qv(1+η) · βcq(1−βcq) < p. Hence, this is
a necessary condition for plan NL to buy a PE, otherwise plan NL cannot be a PE.
Remember that the condition for plan N in one-period model to be a PE is v < p,
which tell us that v is a price that the consumer cannot reject. Here, in the two period
model, the consumer has more choices, hence the price that the consumer cannot
reject becomes lower which should be strictly smaller than the product value. And
with plan NL, the bigger the consumer's time factor βc is, the smaller the acceptable
low price is for the consumer.
The expected utility of plan NL is
q · u1(v,Π, p, 0, p, 1, 0, q) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, 0, 0),
where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of not buying when price is low with proba-
bility q which equals 0+βcq[v−p+η(1−q)(v−p)]+βc(1−q)[0+ηq(−λv+p)] and the
second expression is the utility of not buying when the price is high with probability
1 − q which equals 0 + βcq[v − p + η(1 − q)(v − p)] + βc(1 − q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)].
Therefore, the total expected utility is βcq(v − p)− βcηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
Plan NB The consumer expected never to buy in time 1 and always buy in time
2. If the consumer follows his plan and does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, p+(1−q)∆, 0, 0, 1) = 0
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)[v − p−∆− ηq∆)],
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where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility in time 1
which is the same as plan NN and NL. The second line is the expected utility of
time 2, βcq[v − p + η(1 − q)∆] is the utility of buying when the price is low with
probability q and βc(1− q)[v− p−∆− ηq∆)] is the utility of buying when the price
is high with probability 1− q.
Instead, if the consumer violates his plan and buys the item in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, 0, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 0, 1) = v − p∗1 + ηv − ηp∗1
+βcη(−q + 0)(λv − p) + βcη[−(1− q) + 0](λv − p−∆),
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility in time 1 which
is the same as plan NN and NL. The second line is the gain-loss utility of time 2,
originally, the consumer expected always to buy in time 2 and then he cannot buy
in time 2 since he buys in time 1, βcη(−q+ 0)(λv− p) is the loss of the product and
the gain of the money when time 2's price is low with probability q and βcη[−(1−
q) + 0](λv − p−∆) is the loss of the product and the gain of the money when the
price is high with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηv − ηp∗1 + βcη(−q + 0)(λv − p) + βcη[−(1− q) + 0](λv − p−∆)
= 0 + βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)[v − p−∆− ηq∆).
(6)
Equation (6) implies the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
(1+η)v−β(1+ηλ)v+βc(1+η)p+βc(1+η)(1−q)∆
1+η
, to-
gether with the condition p∗1 < p, we have the condition v− βc(1−βc) [
η(λ−1)v
(1+η)
−(1−q)∆] <
p. Hence, this is a necessary condition for plan NB to be a PE, otherwise plan NB
cannot be a PE.
This condition is similar as plan NL, just the price diﬀerence ∆ also has an eﬀect
here.
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The expected utility of plan NB is
q · u1(v,Π, p, 0, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 0, 1) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, 0, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, 0, 1),
where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of not buying when price is low with proba-
bility q which equals 0 +βcq[v− p+ η(1− q)∆] +βc(1− q)(v− p−∆− ηq∆) and the
second expression is the utility of not buying when the price is high with probability
1−q which equals 0+βcq[v−p+η(1−q)∆]+βc(1−q)(v−p−∆−ηq∆). Therefore,
the total expected utility is βc(v − p)− βc(1− q)∆.
Plan LN The consumer expected to buy only at the low price in time 1 and never
buy in time 2. If he buys the item in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, 0, 1, q, 0) = v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1),
where v−p∗1 is the consumption utility derives from receiving the product and paying
the realized price, ηq(p − p∗1) is the gain-loss utility from paying the realized price
where he expected to pay the low price with probability q and η(1− q)(v−p∗1) is the
unexpected gain of the product and the unexpected loss of the money from buying
where he expected not buy when price is high with probability 1− q.
Instead, if he does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, 0, 0, q, 0) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p),
where zero is the consumption utility and ηq(−λv + p) is the gain-loss utility that
he does not buy where he expected to buy when price is low with probability q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p). (7)
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Equation (7) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+η(1−q)v+ηλqv
1+η
, together with the
condition p ≤ p∗1 < p + ∆, we have the condition p ≤ v + η(λ−1)qv1+η < p + ∆. Hence,
this is a necessary condition for plan LN to be a PE, otherwise, plan LN cannot be
a PE.
This condition is the same as the condition of plan L in one-period model, which
states that the consumer is willing to accept a low price that is strictly greater
than v when the consumer expected to buy with positive probability. And the high
price should be strictly than an amount, otherwise the consumer will violate his
expectation and buy at the high price in time 1.
The expected utility of plan LN is
q · u1(v,Π, p, p, 0, 1, q, 0) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, 0, q, 0)
where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of buying when price is low with probability
q which equals v − p + η(1 − q)(v − p) and the second expression is the utility of
not buying when price is high with probability 1− q which equals 0 + ηq(−λv + p).
Therefore, the total expected utility of plan LN is q(v − p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
Plan LL The consumer expected to buy only at the low price in time 1 and if
there is a high price in time 1 then buy only at the low price in time 2. If he buys
the product in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, p, 1, q, q) = v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1)
+βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p),
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility in time 1 which
is the same as plan LN. The second line is the expected gain-loss utility of time
2, βη[−(1 − q)q + 0](λv − p) is the gain-loss utility of not buying in time 2 where
originally he expected to buy in time 2 with probability (1− q)q.
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Instead, if he does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, p, 0, q, q) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p)
+βcη[−(1− q)q + q](v − p)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)],
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility which is the same
as plan LN. The second line is the expected gain-loss utility of buying in time 2,
it's probability changing from (1 − q)q to q since the probability of not buying in
time 1 changing from (1 − q) to 1. For the third line, βcq[v − p + η(1 − q)(v − p)]
is the utility of buying in time 2 when the price is low with probability q while
βc(1 − q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)] is the utility of not buying in time 2 when the price is
high with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1) + βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p)
= 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + βcη[−(1− q)q + q](v − p)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)].
(8)
Equation (8) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+η(1−q)v+ηλqv−βc(1+η)qv+βc(1+η)qp
1+η
,
together with the condition p ≤ p∗1 < p + ∆, we have p ≤ v + 1(1−βcq) ·
ηq(λ−1)v
(1+η)
<
p + ∆
(1−βcq) . Hence, this is a necessary condition for plan LL to be a PE, otherwise
plan LL cannot be a PE.
This condition is similar like the condition for plan LN. Comparing with plan LN,
the acceptable low price for plan LL could be slightly bigger. And the higher the
consumer's time factor is, the higher the acceptable low price could be.
The expected utility of plan LL is
q · u1(v,Π, p, p, 1, q) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, 0, q),
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where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of buying when price is low with probability
q which equals v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p) + βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p) and the second
expression is the utility of not buying when the price is high with probability 1− q
which equals 0 + ηq(−λv+ p) + βcη[−(1− q)q+ q](v− p) + βcq[v− p+ η(1− q)(v−
p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)]. Therefore, the total expected utility of plan LL is
q(v − p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v + βcq(1− q)(v − p)− βcηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
Plan LB The consumer expected to buy only at the low price in time 1 and if
there is a high price in time 1 then always buy in time 2. If the consumer sticks to
his plan and buys in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, q, 1) = v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1)
+βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p)
+βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 0](λv − p−∆)
,
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility in time 1
which is the same as plan LN and LL. The second and third lines are the expected
utility of time 2, βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p) is the gain-loss utility of not buying in
time 2 where he expected to buy at the low price with probability (1 − q)q while
βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 0](λv − p−∆) is the gain-loss utility of not buying in time 2
where he expected to buy at the high price with probability (1− q)(1− q).
Instead, if he deviates from his plan and does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p, p+(1−q)∆, 0, q, 1) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p)
+βcη[−(1− q)q + q](v − p)
+βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 1− q](v − p−∆)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)(v − p−∆− ηq∆)
,
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility in time 1 which
is the same as LN and LL. The second and third lines are the expected utility of
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time 2, βcη[−(1− q)q+ q](v− p) is the gain-loss utility of buying at the low price in
time 2 where the probability changing from (1 − q)q to q since he does not buy in
time 1 while βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 1− q](v− p−∆) is the gain-loss utility of buying
at the high price in time 2 where it's probability changing from (1 − q)(1 − q) to
1− q since he does not buy in time 1. For the fourth line, βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] is
the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility of buying at the low price in time
2 with probability q and βc(1− q)(v − p−∆− ηq∆) is the utility of buying at the
high price with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(v − p∗1)
+βcη[−(1− q)q + 0](λv − p) + βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 0](λv − p−∆)
= 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + βcη[−(1− q)q + q](v − p) + βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 1− q](v − p−∆)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)(v − p−∆− ηq∆).
(9)
Equation (9) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+η(1−q)v+ηλqv−βc[1+ηq+ηλ(1−q)]v
1+η
+
βc(1+η)p+βc(1+η)(1−q)∆
1+η
, together with the condition p ≤ p∗1 < p + ∆, we have p −
(1−q)∆
1−βc ≤ v+
ηq(λ−1)v−βcη(λ−1)v+βcηq(λ−1)v
(1+η)(1−βc) < p+
1−βc(1−q)∆
1−βc . Hence, this is the condition
of plan LB to be a PE, otherwise plan LB cannot be a PE.
This condition is similar like the condition for plan LN, just the amount which low
price should be bigger than and the amount which the high price should smaller
than changed. This change has close relate with the consumer's time factor and the
probability the consumer expected to buy.
The expected utility of plan LB is
q · u1(v,Π, p, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 1, q, 1) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, q, 1),
where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of buying when price is low with probability
q which equals v − p + η(1 − q)(v − p) + βcη[−(1 − q)q + 0](λv − p) + βcη[−(1 −
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q)(1−q)+0](λv−p−∆) and the second expression is the utility of not buying when
the price is high with probability 1 − q which equals 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + βcη[−(1 −
q)q + q](v− p) + βcη[−(1− q)(1− q) + 1− q](v− p−∆) + βcq[v− p+ η(1− q)∆] +
β(1 − q)(v − p − ∆ − ηq∆). Therefore, the total expected utility of plan LL is
q(v− p)− ηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v+ βc(1− q)(v− p)− βc(1− q)2∆− βcηq(1− q)(λ− 1)v.
Plan BN The consumer expected always to buy in time 1 and never buy in time
2. If the consumer follows his plan and buys in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1, 1, 0) = v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1),
where v−p∗1 is the consumption utility derives from receiving the product and paying
the price, ηq(p− p∗1) is the gain-loss utility of paying the realized price p∗1 where he
expected to pay the low price with probability q and η(1 − q)(p + ∆ − p∗1) is the
gain-loss utility of paying the realized price p∗1 where he expected to pay the high
price with probability 1− q.
Instead, if he violates his plan and does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 0, 1, 0) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + η(1− q)(−λv + p+ ∆),
where zero is the consumption utility, ηq(−λv + p) is the loss of the product and
the gain of the money where he expected to buy at the low price with probability
q and η(1 − q)(−λv + p + ∆) is the loss of the product and the gain of the money
where he expected to buy at the high price with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v−p∗1+ηq(p−p∗1)+η(1−q)(p+∆−p∗1) = 0+ηq(−λv+p)+η(1−q)(−λv+p+∆). (10)
Equation (10) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+ηλv
1+η
, together with the condition
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p + ∆ ≤ p∗1, we have p + ∆ ≤ v + η(λ−1)v1+η . Hence, this is a necessary condition for
plan BN to be a PE, otherwise plan BN cannot be a PE.
This condition is the same as the condition of plan B in one-period model, which
states that even when the consumer expected to buy with probability one, the high
price cannot be too big, otherwise, the consumer will violate his expectation and
not buy at the high price.
The expected utility of plan BN is
q · u1(v,Π, p, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1, 1, 0) + (1− q) · u1(v,Π, p+ ∆, p+ (1− q)∆, 0, 1, 1, 0),
where the ﬁrst expression is the utility of buying at the low price with probability
q which equals v − p+ η(1− q)∆ and the second expression is the utility of buying
at the high price with probability 1− q which equals v − p−∆− ηq∆. Therefore,
the total expected utility of plan BN is v − p− (1− q)∆.
Plan BL The consumer expected always to buy in time 1 and if oﬀ the equilibrium
plan and does not buy in time 1 then buy only at the low price in time 2. If the
consumer follows his plan and buys in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+ (1− q)∆, p, 1, 1, q) = v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1),
where v− p∗1 is the consumption utility and ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1) is the
gain-loss utility which is the same as plan BN.
Instead, if he violates his plan and does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+(1−q)∆, p, 0, 1, q) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + η(1− q)(−λv + p+ ∆)
+βcη(−0 + q)(v − p)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)],
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where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility in time 1
which is the same as plan BN, the second line is the gain-loss utility of buying in
time 2 where the probability changing from zero to q since he does not buy in time 1,
the third line is the expected utility of time 2, βcq[v−p+η(1−q)(v−p)] is the utility
of buying in time 2 at the low price with probability q and βc(1−q)[0+ηq(−λv+p)]
is the utility of not buying at the high price with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1)
= 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + η(1− q)(−λv + p+ ∆) + βcη(−0 + q)(v − p)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)(v − p)] + βc(1− q)[0 + ηq(−λv + p)].
(11)
Equation (11) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+ηλv−βc[1+η−η(1−q)(λ−1)]qv+βc(1+η)qp
1+η
,
together with the condition p+∆ ≤ p∗1, we have p+ ∆1−βcq ≤ v+
η(λ−1)v+βcη(1−q)(λ−1)qv
(1+η)(1−βcq) .
Hence, this is a necessary condition for plan BL to be a PE, otherwise plan BL cannot
be a PE.
This condition is similar like the condition for plan BN, which states that the high
price should be smaller than an amount to make the consumer follow his original
plan. Here the amount is higher than plan BN.
The expected utility of plan BL is v − p− (1− q)∆ which the same as plan BN.
Plan BB The consumer expected always to buy in time 1 and if oﬀ the equilibrium
plan and does not buy in time 1 then the always buy in time 2. If the consumer
follows his plan and buys in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+(1−q)∆, p+(1−q)∆, 1, 1, 1) = v−p∗1+ηq(p−p∗1)+η(1−q)(p+∆−p∗1),
where v− p∗1 is the consumption utility and ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1) is the
gain-loss utility which is the same as plan BN and BL.
73
Instead, if he violates his plan and does not buy in time 1, his utility is
u1(v,Π, p
∗
1, p+(1−q)∆, p+(1−q)∆, 0, 1, 1) = 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + η(1− q)(−λv + p+ ∆)
+βcη(−0 + q)(v − p) + βcη(−0 + 1− q)(v − p−∆)
+βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)(v − p−∆− ηq∆),
where the ﬁrst line is the consumption utility and the gain-loss utility in time 1
which is the same as plan BN and BL, in the second line, βcη(−0 + q)(v − p) is the
gain-loss utility of buying at the low price in time 2 where it's probability changing
from zero to q since he does not buy in time 1 and βcη(−0 + 1 − q)(v − p − ∆) is
the gain-loss utility of buying at the high price where the probability changing from
zero to 1− q, the third line is the expected utility of time 2, βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆]
is the consumption utility and gain-loss utility of buying in time 2 at the low price
with probability q and βc(1 − q)(v − p − ∆ − ηq∆) is the utility of buying at the
high price with probability 1− q.
When the utility of buying equals the utility of not buying, we have
v − p∗1 + ηq(p− p∗1) + η(1− q)(p+ ∆− p∗1)
= 0 + ηq(−λv + p) + η(1− q)(−λv + p+ ∆) + βcη(−0 + q)(v − p)
+βcη(−0 + 1− q)(v − p−∆) + βcq[v − p+ η(1− q)∆] + βc(1− q)(v − p−∆− ηq∆).
(12)
Equation (12) implies that the cutoﬀ price p∗1 =
v+ηλv−βc(1+η)v+βc(1+η)p+βc(1+η)(1−q)∆
1+η
,
together with the condition p + ∆ ≤ p∗1, we have p + 1−βc(1−q)1−βc ∆ ≤ v +
η(λ−1)v
(1+η)(1−βc) .
Hence, this is a necessary condition for plan BB to be a PE, otherwise plan BB
cannot be a PE.
This condition is similar like the condition for plan BN, which states that the high
price should be smaller than an amount to make the consumer follow his original
plan. Here the amount is more ﬂexible than plan BN.
The expected utility of plan BB is v− p− (1− q)∆ which the same as plan BN and
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plan BL.
4.5 Main result
The monopolist is risk-neutral and tries to maximize the expected proﬁt given the
consumer's behavior. The consumer has nine plans and the following is the analysis
of the revenues for the nine plans. The monopolist's time factor is denoted by βm.
The revenue of plan NN is zero and the consumer's utility of plan NN is greater
than all the other eight plans which means that if plan NN is a PE, it is the PPE.
To make the revenue greater than the product value v, plan NN cannot be a PE
and we have the condition p ≤ v.
The revenue of plan NL is βmqp which is smaller than v with condition p ≤ v.
The revenue of plan NB is βmp+βm(1−q)∆ which may be greater than the product
value v.
The revenue of plan LN is qp which is smaller than v with condition p ≤ v.
The revenue of plan LL is qp+ βm(1− q)qp which is smaller than v with condition
p ≤ v.
The revenue of plan LB is qp+ βm(1− q)(p+ (1− q)∆) which may be greater than
the product value v.
For plan BN, the choice of time 2 (N) is not a PE with with condition p ≤ v and
plan LB cannot be the PPE.
The revenue of plan BL is p+ (1− q)∆ may be greater than the product value v.
The revenue of plan BB is p+ (1− q)∆ may be greater than the product value v.
There are four plans NB, LB, BL and BB may help the monopolist earn a revenue
that is greater than the product value v. We have the optimal price strategy for
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each case by maximizing the four revenues subject to each own conditions. The
revenue of the optimal price strategy for plan LB is smaller than plan BB and the
revenue of the optimal price strategy for plan BB is smaller than plan BL. Then,
we left two choice, buy at time 1 no matter the price is low or high (plan BL) and
wait to buy at time 2 no matter the price is low or high (plan NB).
4.5.1 Wait to buy at time 2 (plan NB)
For plan NB, the consumer always wait and buy the item with probability 1 at time
2. Maximizing the revenue RNB = βmp+βm(1− q)∆ subject to the conditions that
plan NB is the PPE, we have the optimal price strategy for this plan.
When η ≤ 1,
p = v,
q = 1
2
,
∆ = η(λ−1)v
2
,
RNB = βmv +
βmη(λ−1)v
4
, and
uNB = −βcη(λ−1)v4 .
And when η > 1,
p = v,
q = 1
1+η
,
∆ = η(λ−1)v
1+η
,
RNB = βmv +
βmη2(λ−1)v
(1+η)2
, and
uNB = −βcη2(λ−1)v(1+η)2 .
Proposition 1 The above price strategy helps the monopolist earn a revenue greater
than the product value v only when the time factor is big enough. The revenue is
increasing in the monopolist's time factor βm and the consumer's utility is decreasing
in the consumer's time factor βc.
From the above expression, we have ∂RNB
∂βm
> 0, hence the monopolist's time factor
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has a positive eﬀect on the revenue. Also we have ∂uNB
∂βc
< 0, hence the consumer's
the factor has a negative eﬀect on the consumer's welfare.
Figure 4.1. The relation between βm and the revenue
We can see that the revenue RNB is increasing in the monopolist's time factor βm
and it is greater than the product value v only when βm is big enough (If η ≤ 1 then
βm ≥ 45+η and if 1 < η then βm ≥ 1+η1+2η ). By the above price strategy, the consumer
will wait and buy the product at time 2.
Remember that this strategy is also the optimal price strategy for the one-period
model which make the consumer always buy the product even when the realized
price is high. Under the above price distribution, the consumer will buy the product
with probability one in the one-period model while the consumer will wait to buy at
time 2 in the two-period model. The revenue for plan NB RNB = βm · ROne which
is always smaller than one-period model.
4.5.2 Buy at time 1 (plan BL)
For plan BL, the consumer always buy the product at time 1 even when the realized
price is high. Maximizing the revenue RBL = p+ (1− q)∆ subject to the conditions
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that plan BL is the PPE, we have the optimal price strategy for this plan.
The domain of the price strategy is as following, the x-axis the consumer's time
factor βc and the y-axis is the weight of gain-loss utility η.
Figure 4.2. Domain of diﬀerent optimal price strategies
For area 1, we have
p = v − βcq2
1−βcq ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
q =
√
[(1+η)(1+βc)−βc]2+4βc−[(1+η)(1+βc)−βc]
2βc
,
∆ = (1 + βcq) · η(λ−1)v1+η ,
RBL = v + [(1− q)(1 + βcq)− βcq21−βcq ] ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
, and
uBL = −[(1− q)(1 + βcq)− βcq21−βcq ] ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
.
For area 2, we have
p = v − βcq2
1−βcq ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
∆ = [q(1 + η)(1 + βc) + βcq
2] · η(λ−1)v
1+η
,
RBL = v + [q(1− q)(1 + η)(1 + βc) + βcq2(1− q)− βcq21−βcq ] ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
, and
uBL = −[q(1− q)(1 + η)(1 + βc) + βcq2(1− q)− βcq21−βcq ] ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
.
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The probability of the low price, q, is the root of the function 2β2c q
3−βc(3+2βc)q2−
2(1 + η)(1 + βc)q + (1 + η)(1 + βc) = 0 which is always between zero and one.
For the area 3, the optimal strategy does not exists. I justify it with epsilon equi-
librium which one does not want to change a price that would increase the revenue
by epsilon or less. Here, the limit is that at the boundary plan NB is the PPE but
not plan BL.
p = v − βcq2
1−βcq ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
,
∆ = (1 + βcq
2
1−βcq ) ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
,
RBL = v + (1− q − βcq
3
1−βcq ) ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
, and
uBL = −(1− q − βcq
3
1−βcq ) ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
.
The probability of the low price, q, is the root of the function β2c q
3 + βc(1 + η)(1 +
βc)q
2 − [(1 + η)(1 + βc) + βc]q + 1 = 0 which is always between zero and one.
For area 4, we have
p = v − (1−2q)(1+βc)η(λ−1)v
1+βc−2βcq ,
q =
2[(1+η)(1+βc)−β2c ]−
√
4(1−βc)[(1+η)(1+βc)]2−4β2c (1−βc)(1+η)(1+βc)+4β4c
2βc(1+η)(1+βc)
,
∆ = (1−q)(1+βc)η(λ−1)v
1+βc−2βcq ,
RBB = v +
q2(1+βc)η(λ−1)v
1+βc−2βcq , and
uBB = − q2(1+βc)η(λ−1)v1+βc−2βcq .
For the area 5, the optimal strategy does not exists. I justify it with epsilon equi-
librium which one does not want to change a price that would increase the revenue
by epsilon or less. Here, the limit is that at the boundary plan NB is the PPE but
not plan BL.
p = v
q = 1
βc(1+η)
,
∆ = η(λ−1)v
1+η
,
RBL = v +
βc(1+η)−1
βc(1+η)
· η(λ−1)v
1+η
, and
uBL = −βc(1+η)−1βc(1+η) ·
η(λ−1)v
1+η
.
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By charging the above price strategy, the monopolist could manipulate the consumer
to buy at time 1 with probability one and earn a revenue which is greater than the
product value v in the whole domain. Here monopolist's time factor aﬀects nothing
since it does not appear in the price distribution and the consumer is willing to buy
at time 1.
Proposition 2 The above price strategy helps the monopolist earn a revenue greater
than the product value v and hurts the consumer by making consumer utility negative.
From above expression, we can see that the revenue equals the product value plus
an additional positive value and the consumer's utility equals minus the additional
value. In this price strategy, the sale price is low enough to ensure the consumer
buy at the low price and hence his purchase probability is positive. Then, to avoid
the disappointment of not getting the product, the consumer will also buy at the
suitable high price. This price strategy manipulates the loss-averse consumer buy
with probability one which helps the revenue and hurts the consumer welfare.
Proposition 3 The monopolist's revenue is increasing in the loss aversion param-
eter λ and the consumer's utility is decreasing in the loss aversion parameter λ.
From the above expression, we have ∂R
∂λ
> 0 and ∂u
∂λ
< 0. Hence, the loss aversion
parameter help the revenue and hurts the consumer's welfare.
The eﬀect of βc on the revenue This subsection shows the eﬀect of the con-
sumer's time factor βc on the monopolist's revenue when the weight of gain-loss
utility is constant.
80
Figure 4.3. The relation between βc and the revenue when η = 0.7
Figure 4.3 shows that the revenue is increasing in the consumer's time factor βc
when η = 0.7 (the weight of gain-loss utility is big enough).
Figure 4.4. The relation between βc and the revenue when η = 0.2
Figure 4.4 shows that the revenue ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in the con-
sumer's time factor βc when η = 0.2, the consumer's time factor βc has an non-
monotonic eﬀect on the revenue when η is small.
Proposition 4 The monopolist's revenue is non-monotonic in the consumer's time
factor βc, and the same as the consumer's utility.
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When the consumer's time factor βc is big enough, it has a positive eﬀect on the
monopolist's revenue and a negative eﬀect on the consumer's welfare. However,
when βc is small, its eﬀect is non-monotonic for the revenue and consumer's welfare.
Comparing with one-period model
Figure 4.5. Domain of comparison
Comparing the revenue of plan BL with the one-period model, we ﬁnd that the
revenue of plan BL is greater than the one-period in the domain that above the
curve while the revenue of BL is smaller in the domain below the curve. Here, when
the weight of the gain-loss utility is big enough, the two-period model could lead to
a higher revenue than one-period model.
Proposition 5 The monopolist's revenue of two-period model is greater than one-
period model when the wight of the gain-loss utility is big enough.
From the above ﬁgure, we can see that revenue of two-period model may be greater
than one-period model which is depending on the weight of gain-loss utility η and
the consumer's time factor βc. For example, if the consumer treats the consumption
utility and the gain-loss utility equally, then the monopolist's revenue of two-period
model is greater than one-period model.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the two-period pricing model with loss-averse consumers, and
ﬁnds that the optimal price strategy could earn a higher revenue greater then the
product value v and hurts the consumer making consumer utility negative. Com-
paring with one-period model, the revenue of two-period model is greater when the
weight of gain-loss utility is big enough. The loss aversion parameter λ has a positive
eﬀect on the monopolist's revenue and a negative eﬀect on the consumer's welfare.
While the consumer's time factor has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the monopolist's
revenue and the consumer's welfare.
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